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Introduction
Since the last decade local economic development has been a concept in
vogue among regional scientists. Old traditional approaches to regional develop-
ment relied on assumptions and hypotheses strictly concerned with the distance
from markets, availability of labor and raw materials, and considered only traded
interdependencies thanks to which complementary industries are able to reduce
their costs by locating together, i.e. agglomeration.
The process of globalisation brought a change in local and regional develop-
ment studies. As Pike, Pose and Tomaney (2006) argue, globalisation is char-
acterized by complexity, uncertainty, risk, and it requires a much more inte-
grated multi−level governance. In this context, new actors and institutions
have emerged, often interacting through “partnership” relationships. Globali-
sation challenges all territories to directly face the global competition. It bears
winners and losers. Differences in regional capabilities conduce to a marked po-
larisation of economic activities, which in turn exacerbates divergences among
regions themselves. In order to face these new challenges, regions need new
development strategies, able to re-dress the weaknesses, thus reducing the con-
straints to economic potential of individuals, firms, and territories.
Developmental and employment creation policies (top-down policies) have thus,
until recently, been usually structured along two axes. The first axis concerned
with investments in physical capital (Solow, 1956) and in infrastructural endow-
ment (Aschauer, 1989). One of the most spectacular cases of failure of these
top-down and supply-led approaches has been the Italian Mezzogiorno (south
of Italy). Despite more than forty years of huge investments in infrastructure
by the Italian governments, the income gap between the North and the South
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of the country remains at the same level as before the intervention started in
the early post-war years (Triglia, 1992).
The second axis was based on industrialisation. The introduction or attraction
of large firms to areas presenting a weak industrial structure, in combination
with other development policies, has been in few cases, as in the case of South
East Asian countries, a key enacting the economic take-off of these areas (Stor-
per, 1997), often in contexts of strong, state-led national development strategy
support. However, these policies have not been particularly successful in the
long term, and the failures outnumber the success stories. As a consequence,
most of these large industrial complexes remained detached from their local
environments (“cathedrals in the desert”) whose principle suppliers and cus-
tomers were located elsewhere rather than locally or in nearby areas (Lipietz,
1980). Around the end of ’80s, endogenous growth theories underlined the
importance of two factors largely neglected in the neoclassical approaches to
economic growth: innovation (Romer, 1986) and education (Lucas Jr, 1988).
Indeed, since the economic boom of the period after the Second World War,
traditional economic development approaches had spurred “top−down” poli-
cies, mostly producing “one size fits all” developmental models.
Since these traditional local and regional development policies experienced a
large failure (Pike, Pose and Tomaney, 2006) mainly due to weak local eco-
nomic structures, poorly suiting the local social and institutional contexts, over
the last decade an increasing attention has been paid to “bottom−up” ap-
proaches to economic development.
As Pike, Pose and Tomaney (2006) indicate, the “new” conception of local and
regional development strategies is structured around a threefold scheme that
covers development of the economic hardware (infrastructure and education),
software (design and implementation of development strategies), and “orgware”
(Barquero, 1999) that indicates institutional capacity. As Keating (2001) under-
lines, new academic thinking focuses on “places” as “a complex system of social
relationships, norms, institutions and understandings”, supporting the idea that
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development is more than the merely assembling of production factors in phys-
ical space.
The place itself has become a factor of production; outcomes of investment will
depend on attributes owned specifically by places. The new approach considers
“untraded interdependencies” arising from proximity of innovators, manufac-
turers and suppliers within regions or localities and the dense pattern of infor-
mal exchanges encouraged by proximity. Trust, cooperation and competition
give rise to a “regional worlds of production” (Storper, 1997), “associational
economies” (Cooke and Morgan, 1999), “learning regions” (Morgan, 2007),
where innovation is self-sustaining and today’s success lays the ground for fu-
ture success (path-dependency).
In response to these changes, regional development policies have become more
decentralized, therefore closer to the regional and local level where there is a
greater awareness of existing criticalities, and therefore a more effective capacity
for horizontal integration (Begg and Mayes, 1993; Cappellin, 1995a; Cappellin,
1995b). In the European context, regional policies have followed the same path,
since the time of the reform of the Structural Funds in 1989.
Several studies point to the evaluation of the impact by previous regional pol-
icy paradigm structured around a “top-down” approach, with very different
outcomes. While some scholars evaluate as positive or mixed the effects by
these policies on regional development (Mohl and Hagen, 2010; Cappelen et al.,
2003), others find a limited or not influential impact (Bouvet, 2005; Boldrin and
Canova, 2001; Dall’Erba and Le Gallo, 2008). More recently, a number of stud-
ies underline the importance of local contexts, that is a “place based” approach
in the drawing of effective regional policies at European level (Barca, 2009;
Leonardi, 1995). Consequently, the focus is more on local characteristics, such
as the endowment of social capital and / or the quality of institutions.
This thesis is the result of a work started three years ago, aiming to better
define the relation among development and socio-economic characteristics, fo-
cusing on the importance of places. It consists of three different papers, which
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take into account three different issues related to local development, in a very
“place-based” perspective.
The first research focuses on administrative continuity and its effect on the ef-
ficiency of Italian regional administrations in terms of both long term and short
term policies. In particular, the focus is on the relation among administrative
continuity and the quality of social capital. Since the seminal work of Put-
nam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1994), social capital is considered as crucial for
local economic development. Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1994) argue that
differences in regional levels of social capital explain the development patterns
observable in northern and southern regions of Italy. Criticism of this approach
mostly concerns its vision too anchored in history, thus trapped in a dynamic
of historical determinism (Viesti, 2009), with the outcome of assuming social
capital as subject to a very slow change, not much influenced by policy interven-
tions. More recently a new perspective in regional development highlights that
interactions among bridging and bonding social capital is determinant in influ-
encing the general effect that policies have on economic development (Storper,
2005; Trigilia, 2011). As already pointed out, development policies are widely
accepted to be strongly influenced by social contexts and social relations that
are in place within those contexts.
Literature on the relation among administrative performance and administra-
tive continuity is characterized by two main standpoints in conflict, where some
scholars argue administrative continuity may be detrimental to efficient be-
haviour, thus conducing to clientelism and the rising of interest coalitions (e.g.
Olson and Olson, 2009; Olson, 1984). Others argue administrative continuity
may benefit efficiency through a process of learning by doing, producing instead
a higher policy effectiveness (Milio, 2008).
The first paper of this thesis, “Administrative Continuity: Enhancer or Con-
straint for Regional Governments’ Efficiency?” analyses differences in the ef-
ficiency of regional governments in Italy assessing the interaction by adminis-
trative continuity with different typologies of social capital. Results show that
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administrative continuity may be detrimental in terms of policies efficiency when
it is coupled by bonding social capital, while it may be beneficial when it is cou-
pled by bridging and linking social capital.
The second paper of this thesis focuses on the spatial interaction by different
levels of quality of government (QoG), assessing the diffusion of best practices
among European regional administrations. Indeed, institutions are considered a
key factor for economic development and economic growth in literature (North,
1990; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004).
Previous literature focus on the assessment of the relation existing between in-
stitutions and local economic development and on the mechanisms institutions
directly affect development. Indeed, institutions influence transaction costs, as
well as the existing level of inequality and trust in societies (Rodr´ıguez-Pose and
Storper, 2006), that in turn are crucial factors for a socially constructed market
(Bagnasco, 1988).
Notwithstanding the influence by institutions is more visible at regional level
than at the national one (Rodriguez-Pose, 1999), and more effective in mobiliz-
ing those forces which contribute to development, spatial diffusion of institutions
has been widely studied at country level, while regional level has been highly
neglected. Rodr´ıguez-Pose (2013) states that an optimal regional development
policy in Europe should acknowledge “institutional factors, their variability and
limitations and attempts to address the potential shortcomings of institutions
in a place-specific manner”. In other words, as Barca (2009) underlines, the
regional policies in Europe should be ‘tailored-made’ or context specific.
In the light of these arguments, it seems highly important to understand how
regional institutions affect each other when building a strategy for regional de-
velopment in Europe.
Our research underlines the heterogeneity of spatial interactions in levels of QoG
within groups of regions defined as “leading regions” and “lagging regions”, and
analyses different mechanisms of spatial interaction (pure competitive mecha-
nism and competitive learning/imitative mechanism). Finally, it shows non-
13
linearities in the effects wealth and demographic variables have on levels of
QoG.
In the third paper another key issue in regional science and local development
has been considered, that is the relation among the rising of clusters and the
process of innovation. By definition, these two concepts are strictly related. If a
cluster is defined as the “agglomeration of specialized actors that compete and
cooperate” (Porter, 2000), the process of innovation as a “interactive, iterative,
and cumulative” process (Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004) has its origin
in the formation of clusters.
Economic geography literature recognises the existence of two typologies of
externalities originating from agglomeration and affecting directly innovation
processes: Marshall (Marshall et al., 1920) and Jacobs (Jacobs et al., 1970)
externalities. While the former is related to sectoral specialization, the latter
is related to diversification and refers specifically to densely populated urban
areas, where a diversified environment might allow the creation and exchange
of ideas.
The strict social relations inside a cluster may be “positive to a certain ex-
tent” (Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004) because the knowledge process
is cumulative. On the other hand, too much specialization might lead to the
“lock−in problem”, that is the risk associated with the inability to change or
to get back once the process of cumulative knowledge has started (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990).
Several studies analyse theoretically the characteristics of different kind of clus-
ters and empirically assess the effects by Marshall and Jacobs typologies of
externalities on economic development and growth. The focus of this literature
has been within industrial and financial sectors and, more recently, within high
technology clusters (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009; Marrocu, Paci and Usai,
2013). On the contrary, no attention has been dedicated to the agricultural sec-
tor. Few researches analyse the mechanisms of creation, exchange and diffusion
of innovation within agricultural clusters. In the same way, no much research
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has been conducted on the effects of externalities by agglomeration with the
agricultural sector. The research presented here is instead focused on the agri-
cultural sector in Italian regions (NUTS 3), aiming to assess the existence of
a direct causal relationship between the (increasing) specialization and sectoral
productivity in agriculture.
In conclusion, this thesis wants to contribute to the current debate about two
main topics in local economic development literature: quality of institutions
and the importance of clusters in the process of innovation and productivity.
The analysis makes use of quantitative methods, mainly adopting econometric
methodologies and spatial econometrics methods. Each part of the work focuses
on specific research questions and hypothesis, with the aim to provide policy
recommendations both at European and Italian level.
References
Aschauer, David Alan. 1989. “Is public expenditure productive?” Journal of
monetary economics 23(2):177–200.
Bagnasco, Arnaldo. 1988. La costruzione sociale del mercato: studi sullo
sviluppo di piccola impresa in Italia. Vol. 240 Il mulino.
Barca, Fabrizio. 2009. Agenda for a Reformed Cohesion Policy; a place-based
approach to meeting European Union challenges and expectations. European
Communities.
Barquero, Antonio Va´zquez. 1999. Desarrollo, redes e innovacio´n: lecciones
sobre desarrollo endo´geno. Ediciones Pira´mide.
Bathelt, Harald, Anders Malmberg and Peter Maskell. 2004. “Clusters and
knowledge: local buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge cre-
ation.” Progress in human geography 28(1):31–56.
Beaudry, Catherine and Andrea Schiffauerova. 2009. “Who’s right, Marshall
or Jacobs? The localization versus urbanization debate.” Research Policy
38(2):318–337.
Begg, Iain and David Mayes. 1993. “Cohesion, convergence and economic and
monetary union in Europe.” Regional Studies 27(2):149–155.
Boldrin, Michele and Fabio Canova. 2001. “Inequality and convergence in Eu-
ropes regions: reconsidering European regional policies.” Economic policy
16(32):205–253.
15
REFERENCES
Bouvet, Florence. 2005. “European Union regional policy: Allocation determi-
nants and effects on regional economic growth.” Department of Economics,
University of California, Davis .
Cappelen, Aadne, Fulvio Castellacci, Jan Fagerberg and Bart Verspagen. 2003.
“The impact of EU regional support on growth and convergence in the Eu-
ropean Union.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 41(4):621–644.
Cappellin, R. 1995a. “Una politica regionale nazionale orientata al mercato
tra i nuovi modelli organizzativi e federalismo.” Regioni e Sviluppo: Modelli,
politiche e riforme, Milan: Franco Angeli .
Cappellin, Riccardo. 1995b. Regional development, federalism and interregional
co-operation. In Competitive European Peripheries. Springer pp. 41–57.
Cohen, Wesley M and Daniel A Levinthal. 1990. “Absorptive capacity: a
new perspective on learning and innovation.” Administrative science quar-
terly 35(1).
Cooke, Philip and Kevin Morgan. 1999. “The associational economy: firms,
regions, and innovation.” OUP Catalogue .
Dall’Erba, Sandy and Julie Le Gallo. 2008. “Regional convergence and the
impact of European structural funds over 1989–1999: A spatial econometric
analysis*.” Papers in Regional Science 87(2):219–244.
Jacobs, Jane et al. 1970. “The economy of cities.” The economy of cities. .
Keating, Michael. 2001. “Rethinking the Region Culture, Institutions and Eco-
nomic Development in Catalonia and Galicia.” European Urban and Regional
Studies 8(3):217–234.
Leonardi, Robert. 1995. “Regional development in Italy: social capital and the
Mezzogiorno.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 11(2):165–79.
Lipietz, Alain. 1980. The structuration of space, the problem of land, and spatial
policy. Centre d’e´tudes prospectives d’e´conomie mathe´matique applique´es a`
la planification.
Lucas Jr, Robert E. 1988. “On the mechanics of economic development.”
Journal of monetary economics 22(1):3–42.
Marrocu, Emanuela, Raffaele Paci and Stefano Usai. 2013. “Productivity growth
in the Old and New Europe: the role of agglomeration externalities.” Journal
of Regional Science 53(3):418–442.
Marshall, Alfred, Alfred Marshall, Alfred Marshall and Alfred Marshall. 1920.
“Principles of economics: an introductory volume.”.
Milio, Simona. 2008. “How political stability shapes administrative performance:
The Italian case.” West European Politics 31(5):915–936.
16
REFERENCES
Mohl, Philipp and Tobias Hagen. 2010. “Do EU structural funds promote re-
gional growth? New evidence from various panel data approaches.” Regional
Science and Urban Economics 40(5):353–365.
Morgan, Kevin. 2007. “The learning region: institutions, innovation and regional
renewal.” Regional studies 41(S1):S147–S159.
North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, institutional change and economic per-
formance. Cambridge university press.
Olson, Mancur. 1984. “The Rise And Decline Of Nations: Economic Growth,
Stagflation, And Social Rigidities Author: Mancur Olson, Publisher: Yal.”.
Olson, Mancur and Mancur Olson. 2009. The logic of collective action: public
goods and the theory of groups. Vol. 124 Harvard University Press.
Pike, Andy, A Rodr´ıguez Pose and John Tomaney. 2006. Local and regional
development. Routledge.
Porter, Michael E. 2000. “Location, competition, and economic develop-
ment: Local clusters in a global economy.” Economic development quarterly
14(1):15–34.
Putnam, Robert D, Robert Leonardi and Raffaella Y Nanetti. 1994. Making
democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy. Princeton university press.
Rodriguez-Pose, Andre´s. 1999. “Instituciones y desarrollo econo´mico.” Ciudad
y Territorio. Estudios Territoriales 31(122):775–784.
Rodr´ıguez-Pose, Andre´s. 2013. “Do institutions matter for regional develop-
ment?” Regional Studies 47(7):1034–1047.
Rodr´ıguez-Pose, Andre´s and Michael Storper. 2006. “Better rules or stronger
communities? On the social foundations of institutional change and its eco-
nomic effects.” Economic geography 82(1):1–25.
Rodrik, Dani, Arvind Subramanian and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. “Institutions
rule: the primacy of institutions over geography and integration in economic
development.” Journal of economic growth 9(2):131–165.
Romer, Paul M. 1986. “Increasing returns and long-run growth.” The journal
of political economy pp. 1002–1037.
Solow, Robert M. 1956. “A contribution to the theory of economic growth.”
The quarterly journal of economics 70(1):65–94.
Storper, Michael. 1997. The regional world: territorial development in a global
economy. Guilford Press.
Storper, Michael. 2005. “Society, community, and economic development.”
Studies in comparative international development 39(4):30–57.
17
REFERENCES
Trigilia, C. 2011. “Capitale sociale tra economia e sociologia: avanti con
giudizio.” G. De Blasio, P. Sestito, Il capitale sociale. Che cos e` e che cosa
spiega, Donzelli, Roma .
Triglia, Carlo. 1992. Sviluppo senza autonomia: effetti perversi delle politiche
nel Mezzogiorno. Vol. 54 Il mulino.
Viesti, Gianfranco. 2009. “Mezzogiorno a tradimento.” Il Nord, il Sud e la
politica che non c’e`, Laterza, Roma-Bari .
18
Administrative Continuity: Enhancer or
Constraint for Regional Governments’
Efficiency?
Abstract
This work shows that administrative continuity is an enhancer of regional governments’
efficiency in Italian regions. Moreover, the analysis explores the different effect of
administrative continuity on implemented policies when coupled with a certain quality
of social capital, considering both cases of long and short term policies. The literature
explains the positive and negative effects that administrative continuity has on regional
governments’ performance (e.g. Olson 1982; Milio 2008), but it does not specify
the socio-cultural factors explaining why continuity itself might be an enhancer or a
constraint of the performance by regional government. The research analyses these
relationships, assessing whether administrative continuity may foster political patronage
when bonding social capital is prevalent compared to bridging social capital, or when the
predominant factor in the social capital is represented by the linking social capital. This
may be due to an evaluation by politicians based on particular interests of particular
groups, rather than on common interests (Nannicini et al. 2010). This standpoint
is confirmed in the case of long term policies (health care mobility) while there is
no evidence of this in case of short term policies (absorption of EU structural funds)
analysis. While recently the focus has been on the analysis of the efficient institutions at
Italian provincial level through cross-section analysis (Giordano and Tommasino 2011),
this study takes into consideration Italian regions (NUTS 2) as unit of analysis through
panel data covering a time frame of seventeen years (1995-2011).
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1 Introduction
This research aims to analyse the role and the effects of administrative continu-
ity (hereafter also AC) on regional administrative efficiency (hereafter also AE),
given different levels and quality of social capital (hereafter also SC) (bond-
ing, bridging and linking) in Italian regions (NUTS 2). This work focuses on
the regional level of government, as it is considered the most suitable unit of
analysis, in the Italian case, given the research purposes. The Italian regional
governments have larger powers and resources than other local governments.
Consequently, the analysis of the drivers of regional governments’ efficiency has
several political implications, since a large number of regional policies are exclu-
sively or mainly managed by regional governments (e.g. health care). Since the
landmark study by Putnam et al. (1993), Italy has been the object of various
studies on the effect of SC on administrative efficiency and quality of govern-
ment. This research considers three different components of SC: bonding SC
represents the relationship within exclusive groups or communities, bridging SC
indicates the relationship between different communities or groups of people
and it is related to the degree of civicness (Storper, 2005), linking SC stands
for the cooperative behavior within inclusive group or communities (Sabatini,
2009). Capturing the relational aspects of SC allows to assess social interactions
among people, which influence their culture dynamically (Trigilia, 2011).
The literature on administrative continuity explains both the positive and neg-
ative effects by continuity on the performance of the regional governments, but
it does not consider and specify the socio-cultural factors explaining the condi-
tions in which continuity may be an enhancer or a constraint for the efficiency
of the regional governments. This represents a important limitation which this
work aims to overcome.
The literature on administrative continuity (see Section 2.2) includes two main
lines of thought. On the one hand, several authors suggest that the turnover of
political administrators tackles some constraints of governments’ performances.
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An high turnover suggests meritocracy and competition because it shows that
incompetent administrators have to take responsibility and leave their office
(Ferejohn, 1986). Olson (1982) suggests that a low turnover may lead to en-
trenchment of distributive coalitions, which ultimately interferes with the policy-
making. Indeed, changes in cabinet members are considered to prevent the cre-
ation of little feudal areas within the government (Bueno de Mesquita, 2000).
According to Feiok and Strema (1998) government turnover is beneficial be-
cause it brings in different skills and expertise, and represents a pressure on
managers to work harder.
On the other hand, some studies provide evidences that AC improves some
dimensions of the performances of regional governments (e.g. Pfiffner, 1987;
Milio, 2008) since the high complex jobs need time to be mastered and only
after some experience the effectiveness is maximized. When analysing the ab-
sorption of Structural Funds in a sample of Italian regions, Milio (2008) looks at
the benefits of having a low turnover of regional administrators, which acquires
a stronger specialization and a global understanding of the problems they are
facing. This perspective also analyses the benefits of developing a coherent and
consistent long term strategy, driven by AC.
Evaluating the literature on the linkages between SC and AE, it is reasonable to
expect that continuity is enabled as a positive factor for AE when a high level
of civicness SC is in place, in particular in the case of the implementation of
common good oriented policies. On the contrary, the continuity of leadership
in those regions showing a low level of civicness is expected to be negative for
common needs satisfaction. In fact, in the latter case, there is less control on
bad practices by politicians, which in turn leads to the consolidation of political
patronage already in place due to a scarce level of civicness. In other words,
continuity may trigger both a virtuous and vicious circle, depending on the level
and quality of SC embedded in a region. Our analysis shows administrative con-
tinuity is an enhancer for regional administration’s efficiency when it is coupled
by bridging and linking SC, while it represents a constraint when coupled by
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bonding SC.
This paper is structured as follows: after the introduction, the second section
presents an overview of the literature on SC, AE and AC. The third section
focuses on research questions and on the discussion of the variables selected for
the analysis. Variables have been chosen carefully referring to previous works
on SC, AE and AC. Methodology and the model are described in the fourth
section. The fifth section is devoted to the description of results. This section
provides evidences supporting the research hypothesis about the impact by AC
on AE, and, more in deep, it describes the qualities of social relations able to
trigger a positive or a negative effect by AC. Since the analysis makes use of
several indicators and variables, both general answers to research questions and
particular insights are faced out. An important differentiation is made between
the effect of AC on long-term and short-term policies. Furthermore, a subsec-
tion is devoted to Southern regions, since the implications of the results are
contradicting partially the current literature. Finally, the sixth section summa-
rizes the results providing answers to the research questions and underlying the
political implications of such outcomes.
2 Administrative Efficiency and Social Capital in Italy
2.1 Social Capital
Since the landmark study on SC in Italian regions, conducted by Putnam et al.
(1993), in which particular attention is dedicated to the historical conditions
of northern-southern dualism, a considerable amount of research has been pub-
lished on SC in Italy, providing many definitions of this concept. The collectivist
(Putnam 1993, 1996, 2000) approach defines SC as a factor existing only within
an organized society. This approach draws on the work of the American soci-
ologist Robert D. Putnam, identifying SC as “trust, norms that regulate it, the
networks of civic associations, elements that improve the efficiency of the orga-
nization’s efforts in promoting social mutual agreement” (Putnam, 1993: 196).
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Other scholars define SC as the degree of trust in social relations: Fukuyama
argues that SC is a resource coming from the prevalence of trust in society or in
a part of it (Fukuyama, 1996: 40). The author also highlights that SC may be
defined as trust and the expectation that arises within a community, predictable,
fair and cooperative, standards based on commonly shared by its members. In
line with this approach, Narayan and Pritchett (1999: 872) propose a definition
of SC based on the “quantity and quality of life membership and rules related
to it”. Finally, the World Bank points out that SC refers to institutions, re-
lationships, and norms shaping the quality and quantity of social interactions
within society (World Bank, 2004).
A second approach considers the centrality of the individual. In this perspective,
social relationships have value only as functional elements to achieve individual
goals (Bourdieu, 1980, Coleman, 1990, Granovetter, 1985). Coleman defines
SC as “the value of those aspects of social structure as resources that can be
used by actors to achieve their interests” (Coleman, 1990: 305). Thus, SC is a
factor that an individual can add to financial capital and to human capital for
own benefits. From this standpoint, the benefits deriving from human relations
not necessarily produce positive externalities. Instead, these relations may trig-
ger disadvantages for those people who are excluded from them.
The choice made in this work is to use a collectivist approach to SC, taking
broadly the theoretical assumptions of Putnam et al. (1993). This perspective is
coherent with the literature on the relations between SC and AE: this approach
has the strength of clarity and simplicity for explaining the SC-AE relationship,
since civicness is considered a driver of AE (see Putnam et al. 1993, Nannicini
et al. 2010, Giordano and Tommasino 2011). Moreover, this perspective allows
to consider social relations among individuals embedded in a particular geo-
graphical location. It enables to measure social capital as related to a territory,
and it fits the research purposes of this work. Finally, the collectivistic approach
has the advantage to allow SC to be relatively simple to assess in a comparative
study, given that the latter may be measured by proxies for a large group of
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regions in the same country.
Several studies underline a close relation between SC and AE usually explained
by single key factors: Putnam et al. (2000) consider the historical factor, Gior-
dano and Tommasino (2011) focus on political participation, while Nannicini et
al. (2010) on political accountability.
The contribution of Putnam et al. (1993) provides two fundamental conclu-
sions for the Italian case: the lower quality of regional institutions in southern
Italy depends on the low level of civicness. In particular, a gap concerning the
existence of a ‘civic community’ (civicness) is observable between southern and
northern regions. This gap is considered to be one of the main factors causing
the diversity in quality of regional governance and, ultimately, explaining the
relatively low economic development in southern Italian regions. According to
Putnam et al. (1993), the differences in the presence of SC is explained by
diverse historical paths. The southern regions are characterized by a deficiency
of civicness, since the Kingdom of Two Sicilies was characterised by large landed
estates that limited the territorial autonomies. Conversely, the Northern regions
have developed a very high sense of civic community because of the flourish-
ing age of the municipalities (XI century) that contributed to the diffusion of a
higher sense of responsibility by citizens being part of autonomous cities. There-
fore, following this interpretation, the different historical paths by Italian regions
determine different levels of institutional performance (ibid.).
However, this argument has been strongly criticized since it conduces to path
dependency, not allowing to imagine a way out from the current situation. As
Viesti (2009:67) states:
“Although these studies have left an intimate and inescapable
mark for every research considering the Italian case, after all these
years it should not only refer to more recent data, but above all find
a way out of the narrow determinism of which Putnam’s theory is
flawed” (Viesti 2009)
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In order to overcome this limitation, Trigilia (2011) underlines the need to assess
social relations as interactions able to influence the territorial culture dynami-
cally. Quantitative research on SC is oriented on the use of particular proxies
that are in some way standardized and well recognised, although studying hu-
man relations through quantitative variables may present some limitations (see
Hadjimichalis 2006). Here it is safe to say that a trade off exists between a
correct picture of local relations among people, related to a particular historical
context, traditions and norms that are typical of each family, each region, and
the possibility to use ‘instruments that leave a trace in directories, files, records,
sales volume etc..’ (Cartocci, 2007: 59), which can be used in quantitative anal-
ysis. The standard variables have proven to be significant in several analyses in
order to explain social relations in the case of the Italian regional contexts. SC
variables have the role to control for social relations embedded in a territory, as
detailed above.
The SC variables used in this analysis are the following:
• Blood donations standardized for regional population (as percentage);
• Adult children (Number of young adult individuals living with parents per
100 individuals aged 25-34);
• Presence of cooperative companies on the total number of companies in
the regions (in percentage) ;
As indicator of Civicness and as proxy of bridging SC, the analysis considers
the regional level of blood donations. Bridging Social Capital is a category that
may be included in the concept of “generalized trust”. This variable can explain
the degree of openness in a region, that is the degree of interrelation among
groups of people. This represents a favorable condition for the coordination
of the economic dynamics and for the construction of a high level civil society
(Putnam et al., 1993; Storper, 2005) .
The level of blood donations, as proxy of bridging SC, is considered by sev-
eral scholars (Giordano and Tommasino, 2011; Crescenzi et al., 2011; Cartocci,
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2007; Guiso et al.,2004) and in literature it is used to assess the effect of SC
on economy, innovation and AE in Italian provinces. It is an expression of
“disinterested altruism, which moves from a sense of moral obligation towards
others” (Cartocci, 2007: 80). The donation of blood may be considered as a
gift to unknown people, where there is not a social obligation to return the favor
(Boccacin, 2000) nor to obtain a benefit. These two characteristics have been
analysed by several authors such as Mauss (1924) and Polanyi (1978). Having
knowledge of who is receiving blood, might cause problems because of ethnicity,
religion and political motivations (Titmuss, 1970). This type of donation is free
from any formal or informal obligations and it does not give possibility of con-
straints or gratitude and penitence. It is a one-sided exchange, and the donor
has not the certainty of receiving back the gift in the future. Therefore, it is a
proof of a great trust in others (Cartocci, 2007). As pointed out by Crescenzi
et al. (2011), blood donations are free in Italy and there is no monetary com-
pensation. Moreover, there is not a problem of unevenly distributed clinics, that
could compromise the equal possibility for anyone in the country to be a donor.
Data are extrapolated from the National Institute of Health (Istituto Superiore
di Sanita’-ISS) with an availability between 1997 and 2008. Missing data are
assessed through a linear interpolation method.
The variable on young adults living with their parents captures the degree of re-
lations inside the familial groups (Crescenzi et al., 2011) and it is used as proxy
of bonding SC. Studying social relations in Italy, Banfield (1958) underlines
that strong familial relations blind the propensity to cooperate among people
and that represents a transaction cost in an economic view. Alesina and Giu-
liano (2010) find out the relation between strong family ties and low degree of
generalized trust. Duranton et al. (2009) consider the relation between typical
family structures and economical outcomes with strong family ties fostering the
closure towards the ‘others’. As pointed out by Crescenzi et al. (2011), there
is no relation between the variable ‘young adults’ and the local unemployment
conditions, underlying the cultural factor behind this condition. Data on ‘young
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adults’ are extracted from the Italian National Institute of Statistics (Istat).
The number of cooperative companies on the total number of companies rep-
resents the will to share common projects in order to grow economically. This
variable is included in other studies (such as Putnam et al., 1993; Degli Antoni
and Portale, 2009) among those variables capturing the level of associativity
between people. It represents the degree of confidence in the workplace among
individuals in the economic realm. The cooperative companies represent a chal-
lenge and a risk as the job of each participant is linked to the job of others.
Therefore, this variable differs from blood donation, for which the contribution
of the donor has not any assumption of refund. In the case of cooperatives the
association has the goal of returning the gift. In this context, the cooperatives
represent the degree of confidence in the collective and the degree of awareness
that combining forces produces better results for those who are participating.
This indicator is considered as proxy for civicness by Putnam (2000). Degli An-
toni and Portale (2009) consider participation to social cooperative as a factor
increasing social capital in its three components (relational networks, general-
ized trust and relational skills). The Italian national institute of statistics (Istat)
takes into account the participation to social cooperatives as able to explain the
component of social capital referred to social relation, together with participa-
tion to volunteer association. Sabatini (2009) underlines that membership in
an association triggers an increased incidence of cooperative behavior, and it
represents, as suggested by Putnam et al. (1993), a “school of democracy”.
The linking social capital represents, in the words of Sabatini (2009), the “ver-
tical relationships that connect individuals, or social networks they belong to,
to persons or groups who are in positions of political or economical power”.
There are some drawbacks in considering participation to volunteer association
as proxies of linking social capital. In fact, Sabatini (2009) argues that par-
ticipation to these kind of association is mostly made within circles of people
belonging to the same social class, and it is not simple to capture the degree of
the involvement by participants, who may just participate in the sense of paying
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an annual fee, rather than being really involved. Then, it is more convenient to
consider the involvement of the relations and the intensity of the commitment
required. Consequently, we consider the percentage of cooperatives on total
firms in a region as a valid proxy for linking social capital.
2.2 Administrative Efficiency and Administrative Continuity:
theory and empirical evidence
Administrative Efficiency is a concept used by Putnam et al. (1993) to study
the relations between SC (as civicness) and quality of formal institutions. The
authors label the concept of institutional performance as institutional effective-
ness, conducting an evaluation of the policy processes, pronouncements and
implementation. They create an index of institutional performance to measure
the degree of innovativeness in legislation and in economic policy instruments.
More recently, Cartocci (2007) and Milio (2008) have considered, respectively,
health care mobility and the levels of expenditure of EU Structural Funds as
appropriate indicators to evaluate regional formal institutions. This research
builds on these contributions, using these indicators since they are considered
as being strictly dependent on regional government policies, with the advantage
to show, with limited drawbacks, the policy outcomes of regional governments
in relation with AC and qualities of SC.
A number of recent studies focuses on the relations between efficiency of the
public sector and aspects of social life in Italian provinces (NUTS 3). A rele-
vant study in this field has been conducted by two researchers of Bank of Italy,
Giordano and Tommasino (2012). The authors highlight the relation between
the efficiency of the Italian public sector and both political participation and
generalized morality. In their study, the authors identify indicators in the areas
of public health, public education, civil justice, childcare and waste collection,
using a method based on Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), to measure public
administration efficiency. political participation is measured as the number of
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newspapers sold in provinces (building on previous work by Guiso, Sapienza and
Zingales 2004), the elections turn-out in case of referendum in provinces and
the results of surveys about personal interests in political affairs; the generalized
morality is measured as the number of blood donations per capita in provinces
and the results of a survey on the use of public services and on behavior (such
as the behavior in case of accidents or when finding money belonging to other
people). The results of this study finds a large causal relation between the public
administration efficiency and the level of political participation, while there is no
evidence of a causal relationship between generalized morality and the efficiency
in supplying public sector services.
The research conducted by Cartocci (2007) finds evidence of the positive rela-
tionship between bridging SC and AE at provincial level. Cartocci uses health
care mobility as an indicator of institutional performance. As the author high-
lights, “health care is the first budget item for regional governments and, sec-
ondly, the quality of health services is a source of legitimacy and trust of citizens
towards the formal institutions” (Cartocci 2007: 103). In order to measure so-
cial capital, Cartocci considers four variables:
• diffusion of newspapers;
• level of election participation;
• diffusion of associations;
• diffusion of blood donation.
The first two variables capture the relationships between citizens and politi-
cal community, with a differentiation between a form of visible participation
(elections’ turnout) and a non-visible form (newspapers’ readers). The last two
indicators (diffusion of association and blood donation) capture the diffusion of
elective and formalized networks. These are an expression of the diffusion of
an obligation towards other people, and the opportunities to accede to a social
network, beyond basic links. The importance of these variables is the capacity
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to include the donation dimension, or in other words, the availability to donate
time, energy or blood. This dimension is considered a step forward from the
simple obligation towards others (Cartocci 2007: 57).
Studying the causal relationship between SC and innovative performance of Ital-
ian provinces, Crescenzi at al. (2011) find out that not only the quantity of
SC is important in exploiting the innovative strengths of a territory but also
its quality. In particular, the bridging SC is the key for provincial innovative
performance in the Italian case. The bridging SC is measured as blood dona-
tions (number of blood donations per 100 residents) and voluntary associations
(number of voluntary associations per square Km), while the bonding SC is
measured as weekly lunch (number of families having lunch at least once per
week with relatives and close friends per 100 households) and, adult children
(number of young adult individuals living with parents per 100 young adults).
Nannicini et al. (2010) show that, in Italian provinces featuring a high level
of bridging SC (measured as intensity of blood donation), a community shares
the rule of not confirming in office a politician who has made mistakes. As a
consequence, where the level of bridging SC is high, politicians are discouraged
from being corrupt. Bridging SC accounts in different ways the relationship
between citizens and politicians, and the selection of the ruling class. Accord-
ing to the authors, if a politician develops his political experience in a province
with a high level of bridging SC, he brings in his political career those rules of
“good” behavior that he always takes as a reference. On the contrary, in an
environment with a low level of bridging SC, it is simpler form political represen-
tatives reflecting this feature, and behaving more opportunistically. From the
voters’ perspective, if they do not share the idea of policy linked to the needs
of the community but favor personal needs, then they will be more prone to
vote regardless of the management of public goods by political representatives
(Nannicini et al., 2010). This contribution, therefore, confirms that the lower
bridging SC exists, the more political patronage is found.
As mentioned in the introduction, the turnover of political administrators is
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widely analysed in the literature: on the one hand, there are scholars who think
that it translates into stability and efficiency, on the other those scholars who
believe that it may lead to political patronage and inefficiency. Ferejohn (1986)
suggests that changes of Presidents are indicative of meritocracy and compe-
tition. However, the stability of regional Presidents during the entire mandate
can ensure the continuity of the multi-annual programs compared to the situ-
ation in which the presidents are constantly changing. Every president has a
different strategy compared to the previous one and changes often create in-
coherence and inconsistency in long-term development policies. A long term
policy cycle requires a number of years to be implemented from design to im-
plementation, while a president lasting a year or two can only follow short-term
issues (Milio 2008). According to Bueno de Mesquita (2000), the longevity in
office typically reflects institutional arrangements that reward political patron-
age and corruption. In hierarchical institutional arrangements, each member of
the government is responsible for a specific field of administration and reports
directly to the president. If a councilor thinks to remain in office for a short
period, the commitment for long-term programs would be a negative priority,
while opting for results in the short term would be more likely (Milio 2008).
Piffner (1987) and Milio (2008) support the idea that a considerable amount
of time is needed to efficiently manage the operations of high-level positions in
complex organizations. Therefore, a public administrator can work with max-
imum efficiency only after acquiring some experience in office. Furthermore,
a short term mandate encourages short term thinking in terms of political ca-
reer avoiding the research of long term results. Acemoglu and Robinson (2002)
defend the idea that fair competition between political parties is desirable to
maintain an elected regional President under pressure to improve policy and
government performance. However, stable political coalitions represent, for the
regional presidency, a guarantee to perform its tasks without constant political
dangers, without the fear to be replaced due to a lack of political support (Milio
2008).
31
3 Hypothesis and Data Description
3 Hypothesis and Data Description
The research hypothesis is built on the contrasting ideas about the effects of AC
on government efficiency, highlighted by the literature analysed in the previous
section. In this context, the evidence by Nannicini et al. (2010) is used to
overcome the dichotomy on the (positive or negative) effects of AC.
Therefore, the main hypothesis considers AC as an enhancer for the AE when AC
is coupled by the bridging and linking SC, while it considers AC as a constraint
for AE when AC is coupled with bonding SC. As shown above, the literature on
the relationship between quality of civil society and quality of politicians (Nan-
nicini 2010) revealed that the quality of the regional civil society has an effect
on the way in which the politicians are selected, and on how they are judged in
case of election. Therefore, AC may foster a system of political patronage if the
bonding SC is prevalent instead of the bridging and linking SC. In this case,
the AC would reveal a negative effect on the regional government efficiency. As
alternative hypothesis, regional government efficiency is not improved by AC
when it is coupled by the bridging and linking SC. In this case, AC may be
an enhancer or a constraint of the performance of the regional government,
regardless the quality of SC prevailing in the region.
In other words, the analysed mechanisms are those concerning the differences of
the impact of administrative continuity in different social contexts. Analysing
in detail the case of Italy, the research question is whether administrative conti-
nuity has positive impacts both in Lombardia and in Calabria (respectively the
most developed region of Italy and the least one). These two regions differ
not only in terms of the economic contexts and wealth levels, but also in the
quality of relations existing among people and the ways in which people tend to
cooperate (Putnam et al. 1993; Cartocci 2007).
Hence, the research question focuses on the assessment of the consequences of
AC in diversified contexts both in terms of cooperation (trust), and in terms
of the concept of public goods (private needs vs common goods), leading to
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different social regulations of the regional political scenario.
The annual turnover of regional Presidents (presidenti delle giunte regionali)
and councillors (assessori) in regional governments is used in the analysis as an
indicator of AC. This variable is considered as the main element for assessing
the political and strategic scenario in a region, beyond the capabilities of sin-
gle administrators. Data has been extracted from the ’register of directors’ by
the Italian Ministry of Interior (anagrafe degli amministratori1). The appendix
reports the classification of regions depending on the average of the annual
number of changes of regional councillors and presidents on the total number
of the regional councillors and presidents in charge between 1989 and 2011 in
Italian regions. The annual turnover is the main variable of the analysis, and
it is used in different ways to evaluate AE. Two AE indicators able to measure
long-run and short-run policies by Italian regional governments have been se-
lected. The choice takes account of the following factors: firstly, the relevance
of the policies for citizens; secondly, the reflection of competencies of regional
governments (Article 117 of Italian Constitution); finally, the presence of these
indicators in the previous literature. Subject to data availability, the indica-
tors reflecting the AE and responding to the above-mentioned criteria, are the
“inter-regional health care mobility” and the “absorption of European structural
funds”. While in the first case (long-term policy indicator) dummies are used
to evaluate the level of continuity of the Italian regions between 1995 and 2011,
in the second case (short-term policy indicator) it is used as an annual Index
taking values from 0 to 10. This choice is justified by the assumption that the
health care system is the result of a long-term policy, then its measure results
in a average for a long period of time. On the contrary, the absorption of Euro-
pean Structural Funds represents a short-term policy, and its measure considers
a yearly change.
Health care mobility among Italian regions is considered as a powerful proxy
for AE at regional level. As pointed out by Cartocci (2007), the devolution
1 www.amministratori.interno.it
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process, started in Italy in the seventies, made the regional health care systems
as the main budget items for regional governments. Consequently, the perfor-
mances in this sector represent a priority for regional governments. Furthermore,
health care has an extreme social importance, and citizens are very careful about
the right to receive appropriate health care treatment (Eurobarometer 2010).
Furthermore, local health care managers are chosen by regional governments
through political decisions. Consequently, the decision making process in health
care is a political process (Cartocci 2007). However, people have the possibility
to choose whether being treated in their own region or in another one. Thus,
the decision of people to not get treatment in their regions may be considered
as an indicator of inefficiency of the regional institutions. People needing care
assistance, would opt for a transfer (which may be difficult and expensive) if
the local health care structures are insufficient or inefficient. For these reasons,
health care mobility is considered as an appropriate proxy of efficiency of re-
gional governments.
Every year, regional governments negotiate among each other the budget for
health care services offered to patients moving from other regions, since each
regional government compensates the costs for the treatments provided, by
other regional health care systems, to its own citizens (Regione Puglia 2010).
This work considers the monetary balance between revenues from other regional
governments and costs to compensate to other regional governments for health
care services, as proxy of long-term policy efficiency. Not only is the health
care the largest item of regional public expenditure and it is the most important
public service administrated by regional governments, but the Italian legislation
gives a particular importance to the respect of financial plans in health care ser-
vices, for both rewarding efficient and virtuous regions and sanctioning the less
efficient ones. In case of inefficiencies, the regional government can be replaced
by national authorities in the management of health care services (Ministero
dell’Economia e delle Finanze 2009).
As said above, data on health care is related to the matrix of the amount for
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which each region is creditor and the amount for which each region is debtor
towards others. Data has been obtained from the Umbria region statistical of-
fice.
Structural Funds (ERDF and ESF2) co-finance national and regional policy in-
terventions in the areas of infrastructure, innovation and entrepreneurship, with
programming periods of seven years (EC 2007). The implementation of the
funds is managed both at national and at regional level. Each regional gov-
ernment in Italy manages a regional operational programme where the main
development goals in relation to the funds are stressed3. Two kinds of data
have been used in order to create an indicator on the absorption of European
Structural Funds: data on allocated ERDF and ESF funds that the European
Commission has negotiated with the Italian Government and Italian regions (de-
cided structural funds) and data on SF that regions have actually spent (paid or
absorbed). Since each region has a yearly allocation which, if not entirely spent,
can be transfered to the following year, it is possible that a region has a level
of payments above the yearly allocation. Moreover, since funds can be paid
after the end of a programming period, a region can manage at the same time
funds belonging to different and overlapping programmes4. For these reasons
the choice is to create an indicator considering the annual payments (from 1995
to 2011) divided by the total amount of decided European structural funds,
considering the total allocation by region from 1995 to 2011 (through the pro-
gramming periods 1994-1999, 2000-2006 and 2007-2013). Moreover, data of
each region has been compared to the total amount of annual payments (on
decided funds) of regional programmes of the entire country. In this way, the
indicator has been constructed as the difference between the performance of
one region (annual paid funds on the aggregate decided funds during the 1995-
2011 period) compared to the others (total data of all Italian regions). National
2 European Regional Development Fund; European Social Fund
3 For an overview of the use of Structural Funds in Italy, see http :
//ec.europa.eu/regional policy/atlas2007.htm
4 For an explanation of the payment system of EU Structural Funds, see Bubbico and De
Michelis 2011
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or multi-regional programmes, managed by national authorities, have not been
included. Therefore, this indicator represents the ability of a region to use
European Structural Funds compared to the average of Italian regions. Data
has been obtained by the European Commission (Directorate-General Regional
Policy)5.
4 Methodology
4.1 Quantitative Analysis
The analysis is based on panel data over a time frame of seventeen years (1995-
2011) for 21 Italian regions6. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation
using panel data with both regional fixed-effect and time fixed effects allows to
control for: factors that vary across regions but do not change over time; factors
that change over time but do not across regions. In this way the problem of
omitted variable bias is reduced in the analysis. Here equation (1) is estimated
using the indicators of regional health care mobility expenditure (divided by 1
million of euro) and of European Structural Funds’ absorption by regional gov-
ernments as proxies of AE. One critical issue addressed here is the possible bias
resulting from endogeneity between AE and SC. This stems from the likelihood
that AE be a function of SC. Therefore, time lags are used to reduce the possible
problem of endogeneity.
In this theoretical framework, the degree of citizens’ concerns for public af-
fairs has an impact on efficiency (due to the pressure that vigilant citizens put
on politicians). In the empirical analysis we capture this link estimating the
following equation:
AEit = β0 + β1ACit + β2SCi,t−τ + β3SCi,t−τ ∗ACi,t + β4Xit + δi + it (1)
5 Data on SF are shown in the Appendix.
6 The analysis considers all the NUTS 2 regions but two NUTS 3 regions (Autonomous
provinces of Bolzano and Trento) instead of Trentino Alto Adige region (NUTS 2).
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where:
• AE is administrative efficiency as measured by health care mobility and
absorption of European structural funds;
• AC is administrative continuity measured as dummy variables (low, medium-
low, medium-high and high level of long-term continuity) when consider-
ing health care mobility as response variable (long-term policy) and as an
Index from 0 to 10 constructed as follow:
ACistand = (
ACi −ACmin
ACmax −ACmin ) ∗ 10
7 (2)
when absorption of European structural funds is used as response variable
(short-term policy);
• SC is social capital with a lag of 5 years when analysing Health Care
Mobility and of 1 year when analysing EU structural funds;
• SC * AC is the interaction term between social capital and administrative
continuity;
• X represents the matrix of control variables (economic and demographic)
that are: log Gdp per capita, population density, regional population;
• δ represents a macro regional dummy and in particular the southern re-
gions of Italy8;
•  is the error term;
• i represents each region, t the time and τ the time lag.
The indicator of AC has been created as the gap to one of the annual ratios
between the number of changes in the councillors and the number of the coun-
cillors in office for each Italian region and year considered. While this variable is
7 Method of standardization from Fischer and Schornberg (2007)
8 The Southern regions are the following: Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Basilicata,
Calabria, Sicilia, Sardegna.
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used directly when considering European SF absorption, when analysing health
care mobility four dummies are constructed in order to represent different de-
grees of AC. The low level of continuity is considered as a baseline and dummies
express medium-low, medium-high and high level of AC. Then, in order to cre-
ate dummies, the distribution of the AC variable (as the average for data from
1989 to 2011) has been divided in quartiles. This choice is justified by the fact
that health care system is a long-term policy, and its efficiency is incremental.
Consequently, we hypothesize that it is not the change of one year in regional
governments causing the efficiency in the health care services in Italian regions,
but the overall trend of AC. Therefore, the average of the AC variable is con-
sidered between 1989 and 2011 because of the lag needed to AC to have some
effect on a long term policy. Moreover, assuming that the positive or negative
effect of AC is cumulative on health care services, the AC average between 1989
and 2011 may well explain the efficiency for each year, from 1995 to 2011.
Some precautions have been taken in order to avoid the possibility that the
causal relation has an inverse relation from the response variable to SC, rather
than the opposite: the analysis considers and controls for problems of endo-
geneity between AE and variables of SC using a temporal lag of five years in
the case of health care mobility as response variable and one year in the case
of analysis of EU structural funds absorption as proxy for AE. This choice is
due to the difference between the long-term and the short-term policies. While
the effect of the quality of social relations can be seen after long time in case
of health care services, the control of the local society on the absorption of
European structural funds is quite immediate.
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5.1 Analysis of Efficiency as Health Care Mobility
In Table 1 results for the first four models are summarized. The analyses aim
to assess what is the effect of AC on AE (measured as health care mobility
expenditure balance) when controlling for social relations as SC. In the first
model we control for blood donations per capita as proxy of bridging SC, for
people aged 25-34 living with their parents as proxy of bonding SC, and for
economic and demographic variables. AC has a significant effect on AE. In
particular, if a region is characterized by a medium-low level of AC, it receives
895 million of euro more compared to a region with a low level of AC. If its
AC level is on a medium-high level, then money received for supplying health
services is more than one billion compared to a region with a low level of AC.
Finally, if a region is characterized by a high level of AC, than its gain is of
roughly 3 billion more than the regions with a low level of AC.
In Model 2 we analyse the effect of AC on AE controlling for bridging and
linking SC. The significant and positive role of AC is confirmed. Moreover,
while the bridging SC has no significant effect, the linking SC has a significant
and negative effect on the efficiency of regional administration.
In Model 3 we control for the effect of AC with bonding and linking SC: again
the effect of AC on AE does not change, with a significant and positive effect.
Moreover, while bonding SC has a significant and small positive effect, the
linking SC has no significant effect.
Finally, in Model 4 we control for the effect of AC on AE with all the three
components of SC. AC is significant and positively associated with AE. Within
the components of SC only the bonding SC is positively associated with AE,
while linking SC is significantly and negatively associated with AE.
In Model 5 the interaction between levels of AC and bonding and bridging
SC is shown. The effect of bridging SC with increased continuity is more
favorable than the effect of bonding SC (that is insignificant when coupled to
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
log Gdp 217,7 106,4 -49,2 -40,5
(256,6) (276,6) (239,7) (243,0)
Density -3,1** -2,3* -2,9** -3,0**
(1,4) (1,4) (1,4) (1,4)
Population 61,2*** 74,2*** 76,9*** 78,4***
(6,2) (7,74) (7,2) (7,5)
Continuity ML 894,9*** 996,7*** 822,7*** 870***
(328,1) (355,8) (298,1) (313,7)
Continuity MH 1217,3** 1341,2** 1106,7** 1146**
(479,6) (515,6) (463,4) (472,4)
Continuity H 2932,8*** 3398,7*** 2942,9*** 3041***
(881,1) (955,1) (844,5) (870,1)
Bridging 5 17,12 14,4 16,1
(19,65) (20,8) (20,4)
Bonding 5 1,59*** 1,94*** 1,9***
(0,45) (0,5) (0,5)
Linking 5 -109,6*** -110,2 -110,1***
(20,01) (20,4) (20,5)
South 2718,7*** 3536,8*** 3018,6*** 3104,7***
(942,7) (1013,2) (913,2) (934,5)
Intercept -3344,2 -5011,2 -1509,4 -3250,7
(3292,8) (3818,2) (3122,8) (3381)
Observations 252 231 231 231
R-squared 0.61 0.66 0,7 0,7
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. 1: Determinants of regional efficiency as Health Mobility
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Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
log Gdp 94,4 172,7 -108,1 -10,5
(239,1) (281,4) (221,3) (223,4)
Density -2,21 -2,1 -1,4 -1,9
(1,5) (1,5) (1,5) (1,6)
Population 56,3*** 64,9*** 67,9*** 66,8***
(5,6) (7,7) (6,5) (6,9)
Continuity ML -316,8 1062,8** 57,84 363,1
(366,1) (523,2) (546,9) (523,9)
Continuity MH 96,7 635,2 310,9 284,4
(500,2) (649,1) (617,0) (609,9)
Continuity H 1493,9* 2599,8** 1694,3* 1654,5*
(881,1) (1054,8) (943,4 ) (981,5)
Bridging 5 -245,1*** -231,6*** - 195,3***
(34,9) (52,2) (56,6)
Bonding 5 0,51 4,22*** 2,4**
(0,67) (1,1) (1,1)
Linking 5 -59,6 -250,1*** -125,5**
(42,9) (52,4) (61,7)
Bridging 5 ML 242,2*** 179,0*** 155,4 ***
(38,9) (56,8) (58,9)
Bridging 5 MH 309,6*** 286,5*** 262,0***
(36,4) (49,2) (56,2)
Bridging 5 H 317,0*** 280,9*** 258,9***
(36,3) (48,6) (56,2)
Bonding 5 ML 4,0** 0,23 1,7
(1,6) (1,8) (1,7)
Bonding 5 MH -1,66** -5,07*** -3,9***
(0,84) (1,2) (1,1)
Bonding 5 H 1,4 -1,8 0,2
(0,9) (1,3) (1,2)
Linking 5 ML -102,7* 98,4 -29,6
(57,2) (62,9) (69,2)
Linking 5 MH 16,5 189,2*** 61,3
(49,3) (56,2) (65,0)
Linking 5 H 3,85 223,8*** 120,3*
(43,8) (64,5) (67,2)
South 2290,7** 3416,8*** 2875,8*** 2962,7***
(880,2) (1013,9) (872,2) (875,3)
Intercept -3344,2 -5050,2 -1509,4 -2644,8
(3292,8) (3902,1) (3122,8) (3170,4)
Observations 252 231 231 231
R-squared 0.7 0.7 0,7 0,8
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. 2: Determinants of regional efficiency as Health Mobility 2
41
5 Administrative Continuity and Administrative Efficiency
high continuity), controlling for wealth and demographic variables. In particular,
when the bridging SC increases by 1 % and it is coupled by a medium-low level
of continuity, the increase in the money a region perceives for the supplied
health services is equal to 242,2 million of euro more compared to the situation
in which the continuity level is low. If the level of AC is medium-high, coupled
with an increase of 1% of blood donors (bridging), the increase in the amount
of euro collected by a region, compared to the low level, equals to 309,6 million.
Finally, in the case of the high level of continuity, the increase equals to 317
million. Also the increase in the bonding social capital appears positive when
coupled with AC, but only with a medium-low level of AC. When coupled with
the medium-high and high level of AC, the bonding SC is negative and not
significant respectively. The effect on AC is confirmed to be highly positive for
the AE.
In Model 6 we analyse the interaction effect among AC and bridging and linking
SC. The effect of the interaction among AC and bridging is significant and
positive. When AC changes from a low level to a high level, the increase of euro
perceived by a region for health services is around 280 million. The interaction
among AC and linking SC is, on the contrary, negative or not significant. In
Model 7 the effect of AC on AE is controlled for linking and bonding SC.
The interaction among bonding SC and AC is not significant or significant
and negative, while the interaction of AC with the linking SC is positive when
considering a medium-high an a high level of AC. The effect of a raise of AC
on AE is very similar when it is coupled by the bridging and the linking SC,
controlling for the interaction of AC with bonding SC. In Model 8 we consider
the interaction of AC with all the three components of SC. AC coupled with
bridging SC has a significant and positive effect. When it is coupled with
bonding SC, the effect on AE is not significant or small and negative. When
AC is coupled with linking SC, the effect on AE is significant only when the
level of continuity is high.
In general, we find that AC has a significant and positive effect on AE, in the
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case of a long-term policy as the health care service. Moreover, we find that
the AC has a different effect on AE when coupled with the three components of
SC. The AC is positively associated with AE when coupled with bridging SC, as
we hypothesized. On the contrary, AC has a not significant or a negative effect
when coupled withbonding SC. Finally, when coupled with linking SC, AC has
a positive effect on AC. However, this positive effect is small compared to the
effect by the bridging SC.
Furthermore, for all models, it is noticeable that Southern regions result more
efficient compared to the others.
5.2 Analysis of Efficiency as EU Structural Funds
When measuring AE through the capability of using SF (Table 3), the results
show that increased AC has a negative effect when it is considered without
interactions with SC. Using the lagged continuity index (one year lag) and the
lagged proxies of bridging, bonding and linking SC, there is evidence that,
shifting from a degree to another in the index of continuity is associated with a
decrease of the annual capacity of spending Structural Funds. In particular, the
decrease equals to 2,4 million of euro, controlling for log GDP per capita, de-
mographic variables and the level of bridging and bonding SC. The effect of an
increase of the degree of civicness (blood donation) is negative for the absorp-
tion of structural funds, controlling for the level of continuity, bonding SC and
for all the economic and demographic variables. The rise of a percentage point
in blood donations (standardized for regional population) causes a decrease of
17000 euro of paid SF compared to the average of Italian regions. Moreover,
the coefficient of geographical dummy shows that Southern regions have the
capability to spend 16,2 million euro more than the other regions, controlling for
the other variables. The response variable is built in a way that already controls
for the higher SF allocations to Southern Regions.
The results do not change much when controlling for all the three component
of SC. In general, AC and bridging SC are significant and negative associated
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to AE. On the contrary, the effect of bonding and linking SC is not significant
on the AE.
In Table 4 we show the interactions between SC components and continuity
index. In Model 13, the interaction among continuity index and bridging SC
is significant and positive, controlling for economic and demographic variables.
This confirms that SF are better absorbed if there is an increase in the gov-
ernment continuity when also bridging SC is at a high level. This also shows
that the contribution of bridging SC is very large relatively to the contribution
of bonding SC, that instead is not significant. Particularly, when the continuity
index increases by a point and the blood donations increase by a percentage
point, the increase of paid SF is equal to 1,4 million of euro comparing to the
Italian average (controlling for other variables). In this case the dummy for the
Southern regions is again significant and positive.
In Model 14 we show the interaction effect of continuity index with bridging and
linking SC. The findings do not change particularly. As in the case of Model
13, only the interaction among continuity and bridging SC is significant and
positive. The level of linking SC do not affect the AE when coupled with AC.
On the contrary, the effect of Linking SC is significant and negative when not
considering the interaction. In Model 15 it is shown the same analysis consid-
ering linking and bonding SC interaction with AC, but both interactions have
a significant association with the AE. Finally, in Model 16 the analysis is con-
ducted on the interaction of continuity index with the three components of SC.
It is confirmed that only the interaction among continuity and bridging SC has
a significant and positive effect on the AE.
5.3 North-South dualism: evidence from the analysis
This research has not as a primary aim the analysis of the “Italian dualism”,
however, it is interesting to discuss the results of the current analysis in the
light of this debate.
Indeed, differences in the quality of governments between Northern and South-
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Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
log Gdp 107,6* 109,8 75,2 108,9*
(63,1) (62,8) (62,9) (63,1)
Density 0,2 0,07 0,2 0,1
(0,3) (0,3) (0,2) (0,3)
Population 0,4 1,6 3,2** 1,3
(1,2) (1,3) (1,3) (1,4)
Continuity 1 -24,1** -24,2** -24,4*** -23,9**
(9,5) (9,5) (9,4) (9,4)
Bridging 1 -0,2*** -0,2*** -0,2***
(0,04) (0,04) (0,0)
Bonding 1 -0,12 -0,1 -0,1
(0,1) (0,1) (0,1)
Linking 1 -6,61 -4,3 -6,2
(4,4) (4,9) (4,5)
South 168,2** 207,3** 209,8** 205,2**
(82,3) (85,1) (88,1) (85,8)
Intercept -1195,7* -1236,6* -976,5 -1216*
(706,8) (703,6) (710,1) (705,8)
Observations 334 334 334 334
R-squared 0,2 0,2 0,2, 0,2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. 3: Determinants of regional efficiency as Structural Funds
ern regions represent a constant outcome by the analyses dealing with the Italian
case9. When treating the problem from a sociological (Cassano 1996) or eco-
nomical (Viesti 2009) standpoint, the lack of civicness seems to be the main
issues for Southern Italian regions, in line with the findings of Putnam et al.
(1993). Accountability and transparency are seen as main factors of change
(Viesti 2009; Trigilia 2011; Barca 2009, 2012). However, the results of this
analysis are not in line with previous research in the field (e.g. Giordano and
Tommasino 2011). In particular, here it is shown that, when controlling for
economic and demographic variables, the Southern regions are more efficient in
the use of SF and in health care mobility expenditure.
Results by our analysis show better performances by Southern regions in terms
9 Recent evidences on EU regions are reported in Quality of Government Institute 2010.
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Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
log Gdp 103,5 106,9* 72,2 105,1
(63,9) (63,1) (63,2) (63,8)
Density 0,2 0,07 0,2 0,1
(0,3) (0,3) (0,3) (0,3)
Population 0,5 1,6 3,1** 1,3
(1,2) (1,3) (1,3) (1,4)
Continuity 1 -69,8** -75,1** -54,8* -77,5**
(29,1) (32,6) (33,1) (33,3)
Bridging 1 -0,3*** -0,3*** -0,3***
(0,07) (0,07) (0,1)
Bonding 1 -0,4 -0,4 -0,2
(0,3) (0,4) (0,4)
Linking 1 -9,5* -6,0 -8,7
(5,7) (7,6) (6,65)
Continuity Bridging 1 14,8* 15,7* 15,4*
(8,1) (8,2) (8,0)
Continuity Bonding 1 0.3 0,4 0,2
(0,4) (0,4) (0,4)
Continuity Linking 1 3,6 2,8 3,2
(6,3) (7,8) (7,0)
South 163,6** 202,2** 201,2** 198,9**
(83,1) (85,9) (89,3) (87,5)
Intercept -1112,5 -1160,2 -912,8 -1129.3
(718,2) (708,6) (714,8) (717,0)
Observations 334 334 334 334
R-squared 0,2 0,2 0,2 0,2
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tab. 4: Determinants of regional efficiency as Structural Funds 2
of AE when considering both health care mobility and absorption of structural
funds. Although data for these two proxies are more favorable for Northern
regions, when the geographical location is controlled for, and demographic vari-
ables (density and population) and the log GDP per capita are taken into ac-
count, than Southern regions result more virtuous. The geographical dummy is
not significant when considering only the log of GDP per capita. Considering
health care mobility, the explanation of these results can be found in the fact
that the health care system quality assessment is related to demographic vari-
ables (economies of scale).
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Looking at the capability to absorb EU structural Funds, the results point again
at the demographic factors for the explanation of the virtuosity of Southern
regions.
In conclusion, the results suggest that Southern delays may be also explained by
demography, and above all by total population, since the geographical dummy
is more significant when analysing only population as control. The policy im-
plication is that demographic variables need to be carefully accounted for when
considering the management of public services and when assessing their supply
efficiency. These findings raise some questions requiring further analysis.
6 Conclusions
The influence of administrative continuity on the efficiency by regional govern-
ments in different social contexts has been assessed in this work through the use
of panel data related to Italian regions and covering a time frame of seventeen
years. The analysis highlights that, when controlling for bridging, bonding and
linking SC, administrative continuity has a positive effect for strengthening long
term and short term policies. This finding confirms that AC plays a positive
role in regional governments. In fact, it assures regional administrations to have
time for taking decisions aiming at long term objectives, without the contingent
strain for the satisfaction of just immediate needs.
This also confirms findings by Milio (2008). When considering short-term poli-
cies and controlling for bridging, bonding, and linking SC, administrative con-
tinuity has a negative effect on the administrative efficiency. In other words,
when the effect of a policy is expected to be produced in the short term admin-
istrative dis-continuity in local governments has a positive outcome. This may
be due to the need by the regional governments to provide the community with
immediate results.
The research also assessed the role and the effect of administrative continuity
on the regional government efficiency when interacting with different levels and
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components of SC. Although the AC represents a positive element for regional
governments, the analysis shows it has a diversified impact on regions with dif-
ferent levels of bridging, bonding and linking SC.
Indeed, when considering long-term policies, the interaction among administra-
tive continuity and bridging SC produces a strong positive effect on the efficiency
of regional administrations. We also find a positive effect on efficiency by the
interaction among administrative continuity and linking SC has been also found.
On the other hand, the interaction among administrative continuity and bond-
ing SC produces a negative effect on the level of efficiency. In fact in this case,
AC is likely to encourage inefficiency probably because it results in political
patronage. These findings oppose Olson’s standpoint (Olson, 1984), whereby
administrative continuity is coupled with corruption in every situation and in all
contexts. This work shows that the relationship between administrative conti-
nuity and administrative efficiency depends on the quality of the SC existing in
a region.
In particular, bridging SC contributes to the positive effect by administrative
continuity, both in case of short and long term policies. Instead, bonding SC
appears to be negative if combined with administrative continuity in case of long
term policies and irrelevant in short term policies. Finally, the presence of linking
SC contributes positively, rendering AC to be positive on efficiency in the case
of long term policies. It is, instead, irrelevant for short term policies. A possible
explanation, confirmed by the literature (e.g. Milio 2008; Nannicini 2010), is
that a positive relation between bridging SC and administrative efficiency oc-
curs because the former component of SC promotes a broader “control” on the
public administrations, and probably, this condition is the starting point for the
creation of a virtuous circle of good practices.
In the lack of a certain level of civicness (Putnam 1993), triggering the “con-
trol” by the people on the management of public goods, administrative conti-
nuity easily leads to widespread patronage. As a consequence, regions with a
scarce level and quality of social capital are affected negatively by an increase
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in administrative continuity. Therefore, In this cases, more discontinuity would
be recommended in local administrations in order to avoid clientelistic behav-
ior. As shown in the analysis, this correlation is more evident when assessing
the outcomes of long term policies, probably because of an higher difficulty by
policy-makers to pursue long-term strategies that produce innovative policies in
contexts where the level of bonding SC is higher than bridging and linking SC.
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7 Appendix
Regions Category
Piemonte Medium High
Valle d’Aosta High
Lombardia Medium High
Bolzano High
Trento High
Veneto Medium High
Friuli-Venezia-Giulia Medium High
Liguria Medium High
Emilia-Romagna High
Toscana High
Umbria Medium High
Marche High
Lazio Medium Low
Abruzzo Medium Low
Molise Medium Low
Campania Medium Low
Puglia Medium Low
Basilicata Medium Low
Calabria Low
Sicilia Low
Sardegna Low
Tab. 5: Regional Continuity Classification on average 1989-2011
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Spatial interaction and nonlinearities in the
levels of Quality of Government in Europe
Abstract
This research analyses the spatial interaction of Quality of Government (QoG) among
European regions, with the aim to provide policy advices for the design of European
regional policies tailored to diverse local institutional contexts. Using classical spa-
tial econometrics, the research studies different mechanisms of spatial interaction and
explains heterogeneous interaction effects on space. In particular, the analysis distin-
guishes two mechanisms of spatial interaction: competitive learning/imitation and pure
competition/cooperation mechanisms. It verifies differences in the spatial interaction
among groups of regions. When studying the competitive learning/imitation mech-
anism, findings suggest autonomous regions interact spatially more compared to not
autonomous ones. Moreover, the effect of the spatial lag is greater among “lagging
regions” (southern regions) compared to “leader regions” (northern regions). When
analysing the pure competitive mechanism, there is no evidence of spatial interaction
among autonomous regions, while the spatial lag is significantly positive among the not
autonomous ones. “Leader regions” interact strongly within a pure competitive net-
work, while there is not evidence of a significant spatial interaction among “lagging”
ones. Finally, by using a semiparametric spatial lag model, the analysis verifies the
hypothesis of a nonlinear effect by wealth and demographic variables on QoG levels.
The evidence suggests a heterogeneous effect by Gdp and a mostly linear effect by
demographic variables on levels of QoG, controlling for the spatial interaction among
European regions.
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1 Introduction
1 Introduction
In recent years research on Quality of Government (hereafter QoG) has received
an increasing attention by comparative political researchers such as La Porta
et al. (1999), Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2011), Rothstein and Teorell
(2008), Tabellini (2010), Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2013), Fukuyama
(2013). This research interest follows the previous large attention on the relation
between democratization and people’s well-being. Since the third wave of de-
mocratization, numbers of countries have transitioned to democracies, yet very
few have experienced prosperity in the people’s well-being, according to many
of the standard measures used. Indeed, Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi
(2009) report weak or even negative relation between the level of democracy
and many standard measures of human well-being (Gdp per capita, poverty,
equality, life expectancy, infant mortality, etc.) at country level. Carothers
et al. (2007) argue that a quarter century of democracy promotion has brought
“bad governance” resulting in an increased level of corruption by ruling elites,
therefore favoring abuse and favoritism in the management of administrations.
As argued by Rothstein and Teorell (2012), the focus on QoG is a reaction
to lack of significant causality by democracy to explain well-being. Only when
democracy is coupled by high levels of QoG, it is favorable to better quality
of life. As Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2013) underline, several scholars
have proved QoG is a key factor explaining the level of well-being of individ-
uals, since it is highly correlated to many of those characteristics determining
better quality of life by people in a country. Rothstein (2013b) broadens the
positive effects of QoG on society translating into benefits, such as absence of
violence, trust, political legitimacy, democratic rights, and welfare gains. Re-
cent researches, such those by Charron and Lapuente (2013), Charron (2013),
Rothstein (2013a), are dedicated to explore differences in levels of QoG and in
perceptions of corruption among European regions and countries, in an attempt
to spot key factors determining those differences. On the contrary, several schol-
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ars, such as Seldadyo, Elhorst and De Haan (2010) and Kelejian, Murrell and
Shepotylo (2013a), examine diffusion of corruption and institutions at coun-
try level. Surprisingly, no effort have been made to analyse spatial interaction
among European regions in levels of QoG. The work presented here wants to fill
this gap, by analysing the key factors affecting levels of QoG at regional level
in Europe, and assessing the mechanisms presiding its diffusion. The compre-
hension of mechanisms of regional QoG diffusion brings important implications
in terms of policy. The European regional policies should be tailored-made or
context specific and should take account of levels of quality of institutions in
place, as suggested by Barca (2009) and Leonardi (1995). Therefore, it seems
necessary to analyse how regional institutions affect each other when building
a strategy for regional development in Europe. After defining the concept of
QoG and summarizing the literature on policy diffusion in the first section, the
research focuses on the theoretical basis underpinning the interaction of QoG.
The third section explains the spatial interaction by QoG across European re-
gions, using spatial econometric tools. The aim is to understand differences
in “clubs” of regions when studying different interaction mechanisms. There-
fore, the analysis focuses on assessing diversities among the leader regions and
the lagging ones and among autonomous and not autonomous regions. Fur-
thermore, nonlinearities are assessed in the causal relation of economic and
demographic variables on levels of QoG. Finally, conclusions summarize analysis
findings and supply policy implications.
2 The concept of Quality of Government
Defining QoG is by default a challenging issue. Although there is a broad con-
sensus about the positive influence of QoG on the society well-being, there
are diverse views about the conceptualization of this term. The World Bank
provides a broad definition of governance, as stated by Kaufmann, Kraay and
Zoido-Lobato´n (2000): “the traditions and institutions by which authority in a
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country is exercised”. This definition includes the process through which gov-
ernments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government
to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; the respect by the citizens
and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions
among them. The ‘standard’ indicators used in literature for assessing levels
of quality of government at country level are from datasets by the World Bank
(The Worldwide Governance Indicators - WGI) and by the PRS group (Inter-
national Country Risk Guide - ICRG), both inspired by the previous definition:
Anthonsen et al. (2012) consider corruption, bureaucratic quality and law and
order by ICRG; Charron (2009) and Charron and Lapuente (2011) consider the
composite indices by ICRG and WGI; Seldadyo, Elhorst and De Haan (2010)
and Kelejian, Murrell and Shepotylo (2013a) use the World Bank Indicators.
Nevertheless, some scholars, such as Rothstein and Teorell (2012) and Fukuyama
(2013), agree on the lacking of practical conciseness by this definition. Keefer
(2004) argues this definition includes almost all political science and political
economy subjects, since as stated by Rothstein and Teorell (2012), it includes
both the manners in which people participate to political life and the capacity
of institutions to implement ‘sound policies’. The need to narrow the concept is
evident. Following Rothstein and Teorell (2012), a definition of QoG should be
clear and avoid opinions on what ‘sound policies’ are. As suggested by Talbott
(2005), the risk of not taking into account some ethical aspects but only the
efficiency or effectiveness of governments, is the overshadowed of human rights.
Then, a normative approach should be considered. At the same time, there is
the necessity to assess the effectiveness of governments behave. Finally, the
concept should be applied universally, for comparative purposes. That means
that no institutional arrangement should be considered. To identify the govern-
ment effectiveness, Rothstein and Teorell (2012) propose the ‘impartiality’ in
the exercise of public power, being it independent by institutional arrangements.
Impartiality has the characteristic to be normatively adequate in the context of
quality of government. At the same time, it is not difficult to measure impartial-
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ity in the supply of public services (through surveys) to proxy the effectiveness
of government policies. On the output side (policies effect), impartiality implies
that governments will be coherent with the principle of merit and qualifications
when recruiting administrators, rather than following clientelistic, ideological or
socio/ethnic logics. Therefore, through meritocracy in the selection of public
servants, governments promote more professional skilled public servants that
will increase the quality of the government services, i.e. the outputs.
Fukuyama (2013), on the other hand, defines governance as a “government’s
ability to make and enforce rules, and to deliver services, regardless of whether
that government is democratic or not” (p.4) and suggests that concept of quality
of governance should be combination or interaction of two dimensions: capacity
and autonomy. Capacity in terms of resources and bureaucratic professionalism
and autonomy in terms of the nature and mandates by the principal. Combina-
tion of those two dimensions, higher level of capacity and less rules or directions,
provides the desirable “sweet spot”, i.e. quality of governance. According to
Fukuyama, QoG can and should be empirically measured. He suggests that
by measuring taxation and tax collection one can approximate the resources
(capacity dimension). Yet, he also raises many issues with the uncertainty and
problems that come up with taxation as a measure. Although he argues that
Rothstein recruitment based on “merit” is problematic to define (what is merit),
yet the professionalism dimension of the capacity seems to be an approximation
of the term “merit”. Moreover, Fukuyama argues that “to say that a bureaucrat
is selected on the basis of ‘merit’ does not define merit, nor does it explains
whether the officials skills will be renewed in light of changing condition or tech-
nology.” Yet, the same stands for bureaucratic professionalization. Professional
and educated administrations (term related to merit) is not a prove itself of
a maximized performance by such administration in the future. However, it is
logical to assume that professionalization is a way to maximize productivity, i.e.
maximizing every administrative aspect included the collection of resources. If
we assume that someone is more professional and qualified for one position,
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we expect that he/she will perform better than any other person with lower
qualifications. Of course, hypothetical situation might be challenged by reality.
Nevertheless, it does not mean that such hypothetical expectation is not rea-
sonable assumption.
From this standpoint, there is no need to separate resources from profession-
alization, because if one assumes that there is maximization of the profession-
alization, then such bureaucracy will also maximize the capacity in term of
resources (taxation). More skilled tax collectors are well suited for this position,
therefore they are expected to collect taxes better than any other less qualified
administrators. On the other hand, it is arguable how society can achieve such
a professionalization, or even to which extent one can measure professionalism
with certainty. Nevertheless, Rothstein’s concept provides reasonable assump-
tions and less categorization.
In conclusion, the concepts that have been described are fairly close and built
upon the same principles, that exclude any type of favoritism, clientelism, pa-
tronage and corruption in the management of public goods and services. The
concept of QoG here adopted is the one by Rothstein and Teorell (2008), and has
an explicit normative content. In fact, the proxy for QoG used in this research
reveals perceptions by individuals on levels of corruption in public services, on
unequal treatment of people using pubblic services, on quality of public services;
all aspects affected by regional governments. A detailed list of the variables used
to build the composite measure of QoG is provided in the appendix.
2.1 Interaction of QoG at regional level in Europe
Several studies have assessed the mechanisms of diffusion of policies and interac-
tion of institutions by considering exclusively the country level. The importance
of geographical proximity is underlined by several studies on regime transitions,
such as Starr (2005), O’Loughlin et al. (1998), Gleditsch and Ward (2000),
Starr and Lindborg (2003), Gleditsch and Ward (2006), Elkink (2011), and on
diffusion of conflicts, such as Murdoch and Sandler (2004), Salehyan and Gled-
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itsch (2006), Buhaug and Gleditsch (2008). Thereafter, geographical proximity
is found as a key factor also in the studies on policy diffusion, such as Haider-
Markel (2001), Mintrom and Norman (2009), Mooney and Lee (2000). Kelejian,
Murrell and Shepotylo (2013a) underline the importance of geography in the
diffusion of institutions, following the arguments by Crafts and Venables (2003)
who consider the distance as a key factor in the explanation of trade and de-
velopment performances: a close distance favors the spread of both formal and
informal institutions. Since the diffusion of knowledge is easier among countries
with similar culture and economic/social conditions, and since it is more likely
that these factors are more similar in bordering countries, geographical distance
represents a serious obstacle to the diffusion of those practices. Others scholars
consider connections among states as related to trade flows, to participation to
intergovernmental organizations and alliances. Some examples are found in Cao
(2009), Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash (2009), Lazer (2011) and Strebel (2011).
Qian and Roland (1998) assume an improvement of institutions as an effect by
competition for foreign direct investments. Casella (1996) underlines the impor-
tance of the standard international coordination among private entities as source
of institutional diffusion. Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) underline
the importance of information in the decision to imitate institutions. Murrell,
Dunn and Korsun (1996) refer to cultural and economical similarities causing
the imitation especially between neighbours. Elkins and Simmons (2004) ex-
plain how there is a positive political pay-off in implementing successful policies
of foreign countries. The mechanisms of policy and institutions diffusion are
heterogeneous and complex: Mukand and Rodrik (2002) focus on the processes
of experimentation and imitation of policies, where the former gives the possibil-
ity to build ‘ideal’ policies but the risk is to be wrong, while the latter eliminates
that risk but is subject to the inappropriateness of the policy. They show how in-
formational externalities by good practices, generated in some countries, benefit
institutions of those neighbors that have a similar economic and social context,
while damage institutions in those countries that have an ‘intermediate’ degree
62
2 The concept of Quality of Government
of similarity. Shipan and Volden (2008) disentangle four mechanisms of policy
diffusion among cities: economic competition, learning, imitation, and coercion.
As underlined by Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi (2009), the World Bank
and the United Nations emphasise the centrality of good governance especially
in the developing countries because it encourages development. Understanding
the mechanisms of diffusion of institutions has a great influence in the design
of policies to foster the creation of better quality of government, especially in
“low developed” countries. Kelejian, Murrell and Shepotylo (2013a) verify how
the creation of institutions in one country has the characteristics of a public
good, with the property of “undersupply when the focus is solely on one coun-
try’s welfare” (pg. 311). Consequently, they suggest that, in order to foster
development in countries resistant at the institutional change, the aid should
be given also to neighbors. Similar results are found by Seldadyo, Elhorst and
De Haan (2010) that identify spatial clusters of well/poorly governed coun-
tries. Despite important researches have been conducted on QoG at regional
level in Europe (see Charron and Lapuente, 2013; Charron et al., 2013), spatial
interaction/diffusion of QoG has not been considered at regional level. This
work is meant to verify if the phenomena of spatial interaction is significant
among European regions as it is among European countries, and, more impor-
tantly, which differences are observable among mechanisms acting at regional
level when compared to those acting at country level. Levels of QoG within
European regions show a large variance; nevertheless, the existence of spatial
clusters is clear (see figure 1), where the higher level of QoG is present in the
northern regions, while a medium-low level in the southern regions. In figure2
is represented the variogram of QoG. It is evident the spatial autocorrelation
among QoG levels, with the maximum value around 2000 km.
Researches on the interaction/diffusion of governance or institutions con-
sider several mechanisms, but no clear theoretical framework is shown. Con-
versely, this attempt has been made in the context of policy diffusion. Several
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Fig. 1: Distribution of the Quality of Government Index (QoG) across Europe’s
subnational regions.
examples are by Braun and Gilardi (2006), Franzese and Hays (2008), Shipan
and Volden (2008). As underlined by Franzese and Hays (2008), spatial interac-
tion mechanisms may be differentiated by diffusion mechanism among European
regions. Since we want to analyse the mechanisms which allows the QoG of a
region i to directly affect and be affected by the QoG of another regions j in
Europe, it becomes necessary to make a distinction between a direct effect by
the neighbours’ QoG in a regions, from the endogenous factors affecting the
level of QoG in that region. Avoiding this distinction might cause the Galton’s
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Fig. 2: The distribution of the Quality of Government Index (QoG) across Eu-
rope’s subnational regions.
problem, i.e. analysing the independent factors when the aim is to focus on
the interdependences between countries decisions. Braun and Gilardi (2006)
make distinction between diffusion and “spurious diffusion”, i.e. “the fact that
a pattern may look like diffusion even though it is not driven by diffusion”, but
it is driven also by “internal determinants”, as Berry and Berry (1990) suggest,
or by “prerequisites”, as Collier and Messick (1975) argue, or by “common con-
textual effects”, as stated by Van den Bulte and Lilien (2001). The way to solve
this kind of problem is the inclusion in the theoretical and empirical models of
endogenous factors affecting levels of QoG.
3 Theoretical Model
The analysis aims to explain the QoG interaction through two mechanisms: the
competitive/cooperative network among regional governments and the learn-
ing/imitative mechanism of interaction. We assume that the level of QoG is
due to regional decision makers (government and public services bureaucra-
cies). Other two agents in our model are enterprises and the citizens/voters.
They are both assumed to move freely across regions. As Wood and Bohte
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(2004), we assume regional governments’ actions, when designing public ser-
vices through administrative agencies, aim to increase the possibility of being
re-elected. Therefore, decision makers benefit by a certain level of QoG because
of the utility deriving from the possibility of being re-elected. We assume this
is function of two effects. A direct and an indirect effect. The direct effect
regards the vote by citizens when the level of QoG increases. Citizens look-
ing for a better quality of life (closely associated to a better QoG) will reward
the government for an increase in QoG and will punish for a decrease of it;
by assuming an equal level of taxation for every region, we consider voters’
locational and electoral choices as a function of the level of QoG. The indirect
effect regards the fact that voters repose their electoral decisions on quality of
life and economic factors, that in turn depend by the presence of enterprises
in the region. This is because an high QoG is related to an higher degree of
cooperation among enterprises. As suggested by Rothstein and Teorell (2008),
the capacity to supply public services impartially augments the degree of trust
among enterprises. Trust among enterprises reduces transaction costs, through
a process of competition/cooperation, as underlined by the broad literature on
regional systems of innovation (e.g. Semlinger, 2008). Agglomeration of firms
is determined by the reduction of transaction costs, as Krugman (1991) argues.
Then, we assume the change of QoG influences the location choice of enter-
prises. In particular, enterprises move, inside a network of regions and based
on their economic specialization, where QoG is greater. Consequently, we ex-
pect that if a region i increases its level of QoG, neighbours j 6= i will react
by raising their level of QoG too, thus avoiding the moving out of enterprises
towards region i. Furthermore, we consider the costs of making a change in
levels of QoG as political transaction costs, that are, as suggested by Wood
and Bohte (2004), “those costs associated with monitoring and maintaining
the principal-agent contract with the administering agency”. Political transac-
tion costs are generally non-monetary. They include the “difficulty of obtaining
information about agency activities, the difficulty of intruding into agency pro-
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cess, and the difficulty of generally altering agency policy”. Political transaction
costs “decrease the efficiency with which political actors can mold and shape
the bureaucracy”. Considering the QoG as the degree of impartiality in offering
public services, the decision makers utility of having a certain degree of QoG is
a function of the payoff derived by the re-election and the costs to obtain it:
Ui(Qi) = F (Ω(Qi),K(Qi, Qj)) (1)
Where:
Qi represents the QoG of a region i;
Ω(Qi) is the payoff derived from the possibility of being re-elected in a
region i;
K(Qj) is the cost of a certain level of QoG in the region i, depending
only by the level of QoG of that region.
The interaction among institutions may be explained through the general mech-
anism of strategic interdependences developed by Besley and Case (1995):
“strategic interdependence arises whenever some unit(s)’s actions affect the
marginal utilities of the alternative actions for some other(s)”. Following Franzese
and Hays (2008), we assume a strategic interdependence between marginal util-
ities of two regions i and j:
Ui ≡ Ui(Qi, Qj)
Uj ≡ Uj(Qj , Qi)
Strategic interdependence between regions i and j may be represented by best
response functions:
R(Qi) ≡ max(Uj(Qj , Qi)
R(Qj) ≡ max(Ui(Qi, Qj)
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The first derivative of the utility function with respect to Qi is set as equal to
zero and solved for Q∗i as function of Qj : Q
∗
i = R(Qj)
The slopes of these best-response functions depends on the ratios of second
cross-partial derivatives:
∂Q∗i
∂Qj
= −(Ui(Qi, Qj)/(Ui(Qi, Qi)
∂Q∗j
∂Qi
= −(Uj(Qj , Qi)/(Uj(Qj , Qj)
If the governments are maximizing their utility, the second-order condition guar-
antees that the denominators in the above equation are negative.
Therefore, the slopes depend directly on the signs of the second cross-partial
derivatives (i.e. the numerator). If Ui,j(QiQj) > 0, the slope of reaction func-
tions is positive. If Ui,j(QiQj) < 0, the slope of reaction functions is negative.
As Brueckner (2003) suggests, if the second cross-partial derivative is zero,
there is not strategic interdependence with flat best response functions. As in
Franzese and Hays (2008), the actions of governments, in the case reaction
function is positive, is defined as “strategic complements”, that is the case in
which the actions by the two regions go to the same direction. In the opposite
case, actions by regions are defined “strategic substitute”.
4 Hypothesys
As mentioned, several mechanisms of policy diffusion have been proved to be
in place at country level. Following several studies on policy and institutions
interaction, such as Braun and Gilardi (2006), Elkins and Simmons (2005),
Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett (2006), Franzese and Hays (2008), Shipan and
Volden (2008), the most recognised mechanisms of diffusion are the following:
learning, emulation, competition/cooperation. The aim of this paper is to verify
not only the interaction among regions on their QoG, but also the existence of
“asymmetric effects”. Indeed, in literature a number of hypothesis have been
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formulated on possible asymmetries in policy diffusion: Kelejian, Murrell and
Shepotylo (2013a) explain that it might be easier to learn by emulating better
examples rather than avoiding worse ones. Shipan and Volden (2008) sustain
that bigger cities are less involved in economic competition and interact less
with other regions compared to the others. Starting from these evidences, we
formulate four hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Competitive Learning/Imitation
We hypothesize that spatial interaction among levels of QoG is in the form
of “strategic complements”: mechanisms of learning and imitative competition
are in place among European regions. Elkins and Simmons (2005) argue the
process of learning might be in place in different ways. Regions may learn from
the “success” of neighbors: in this case a region learns from the best performing
ones; learning can happen through “communication networks”: we expect that
regions with close relations in place with each other (both at level of government
and privates) are the most successful in the acquisition of this knowledge. Imi-
tation is instead the process of interaction through adopting policies, considered
socially proper. The interaction of QoG through this process may fall, as in the
case of learning, in that of “strategic complements”. Braun and Gilardi (2006)
consider the “taken for grantedness” process of interaction: “some practices
may become accepted as the normal or even the obvious thing to do in given
contexts”. Braun and Gilardi (2006) consider, in the same way, the process
of “Symbolic Imitation”. Therefore, the analysis checks if the level of QoG is
affected by neighbors, considering that the “obvious” level of QoG in region i is
affected by the level of QoG of the neighbors j. Following Shipan and Volden
(2008), the model assesses whether the process of interaction is different among
groups of regions distinguishing among those with high levels of QoG (leader
regions) and those with low levels of QoG (lagging regions).
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Hypothesis 2: Pure Competition/Cooperation
The second hypothesis regards the mechanism of pure competition: spatial
interaction in levels of QoG, based on pure competition, is expected to be high
among leader regions, while it is expected to be low among lagging regions.
Competition or cooperation are useful processes for the acquisition of scarce
resources by regions. This typologies of interaction fall both in “strategic com-
plements” and “strategic substitutes” concepts.
As Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2013) suggest, the level of QoG is linked
to many aspects of well-being: QoG is associated with economic performances,
as stated by Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), Mo (2001); it is asso-
ciated to higher environmental sustainability, as argued by Morse (2006) and
Welsch (2004); it causes lower income inequality and poverty, as shown by
Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme (2002); it is associated to better education
and health outcomes, as demonstrated by Mauro (1998); it determines also
higher levels of subjective happiness, as underlined by Frey and Stutzer (2000),
and causes lower probabilities of civil armed conflict as noticed by O¨berg and
Melander (2010).
Therefore, regions compete/collaborate each other in order to obtain better
life conditions through better QoG. On the other hand, since QoG has positive
spillovers, there may be a “free-rider” behaviour.
Spatial interaction based on competition of regional governments is influenced
by the the presence of “leaders” and “laggers”. We expect interaction among
leader regions are stronger compared to those among lagging ones, since “good”
governments (regions with a high QoG) are more ready to react to changes by
their competitors, and citizens of successful regions are more ready to “punish”
their government in front of an improvement of levels of QoG by their neigh-
bor competitors. In the analysis we assume pure competition mechanism works
among regions with a similar technological structure.
70
4 Hypothesys
Hypothesis 3: Decentralization
The third hypothesis considers the differentiation among autonomous and
not autonomous regions. In particular, we hypothesize that autonomous regions
imitate and compete more. As Ward and John (2013), we assume the political
cost of an improvement in the QoG is not linear according to the level shown by
a region. More specifically, the cost for augmenting levels of QoG is higher as
the level of QoG by regions increases. Tanzi (2001) stands higher decentraliza-
tion leads to differences in QoG inside a country. Gerring and Thacker (2004)
underline the difficulties by autonomous governments in managing the process
of decision making, while Watts (1996) argues that higher decentralization in-
fluences positively the level of QoG. Finally, Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente
(2013) do not find these evidence in case of countries. We expect regions with
more freedom in administration have an higher capacity to interact in term of
QoG. In terms of costs, it means that autonomous regions should have less
political costs in rising their level of QoG.
Hypothesis 4: Non Linear Effect of Gdp on QoG
This hypothesis considers the relation among wealth and levels of QoG. In
particular, we hypothesize that the effect of a raise in wealth has a non linear
influence on levels of QoG. We expect that the raise of Gdp per capita is more
important in term of raise of levels of QoG when a region presents a low starting
level of Gdp per capita. On the contrary, we expect to find that a rise in Gdp
per capita in regions where wealth is already high, has a weak influence on the
level of QoG. In other terms, we hypothesize a threshold does exist in terms of
the wealth endowment, after which the level of QoG is less affected by a rise in
Gdp level.
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5.1 Competition Network
In the analysis two typologies of Competitive network have been used: one to
describe the imitative/competitive network, and one considering the pure com-
petitive network. As stated by Ward and John (2013), decision-makers may be
able to learn how to increase the level of QoG from other regions. Learning
reduces political transaction costs. For decision makers is more simple to learn
by those regions with whom they have more relations. We assume that regional
interrelations are due to economic transactions. Consequently, we use the same
network for pure competition and for learning/imitating mechanisms.The first
typology is highly constrained by geographical proximity within a certain dis-
tance1 (figure 3). The second is not limited by proximity, but it is influenced
by it. In fact, in order to build a pure competitive network matrix, an inverse
distance matrix has been used, because all regions are considered as embed-
ded in such a competition network, even if the closer regions are competing
more intensely. The aim is to create an index able to explain the competitive
pressure that generally enterprises are subjected to, when moving out from a
region towards another. Literature regarding spatial interaction of institutions
and efficiency in the supply of public services commonly identifies the weight
matrices reflecting only the geographical factor, as in Kelejian, Murrell and She-
potylo (2013b) and Seldadyo, Elhorst and De Haan (2010). Conversely, Ward
and John (2013), when analysing diffusion in the performances of larger English
local authorities, consider the competitive pressure to which enterprises are sub-
jected by taking into account the technological similarity. They assume that the
more two localities are technologically similar, the more an interaction is plausi-
ble among them. There is an on-going debate in regional economics among two
1 In this model the threshold has been set at 400 km. A common approach is adopted
to compare log-likelihood function values in the spatial autoregressive model and to use the
weights that exhibit the highest value in the model. In particular, it consists of the nearest
neighbors matrix within 400 Km.
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major ideas related to the externalities leading firms to agglomeration in spe-
cific areas (Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). The first idea by Marshall (1890)
states that enterprises have incentives to agglomerate in certain geographical
areas because of positive externalities due to specialization: higher knowledge
interaction, lower transport costs, and the availability of skilled workers. The
second idea by Jacobs (1970) is related to the benefit enterprises receive from
a greater technological diversification because a more diversified market is open
to new ideas, then to innovation and growth. Boschma and Iammarino (2009)
solved this discussion referring to the concept of related variety : the innovation
process is fostered when diversity among firms ranges within a certain degree
of technological proximity.
Our measure of competitive pressure takes advantage of this discussions, since
we consider not only the technological similarities among regions, but also dif-
ferences in efficiency among local economies. By doing so, the research takes
into account the pressure which enterprises are subject to when moving towards
places that are similar but show more efficiency, which in turn triggers stronger
positive externalities. Briefly, the level of efficiency represents the degree of pos-
itive externalities offered by a region to firms, and the degree of innovativeness
account for the technological regime of a certain region.
The index is built in a way that the higher the difference is in efficiency levels
between region i and region j, the higher the probability is that firms from
region i will move out towards region j. The more regions i and j differentiate
in the level of innovativeness, the lower the probability is that firms move from
the region i to region j. Moreover, the index also takes into account the geo-
graphical proximity between regions.
The competitive pressure network has been built as:
cij =

Ej−Ei
(|Ij−Ii|)+1 if Ej > Ei and j ∈ δi
0 otherwise
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Where Ei and Ej are the levels of efficiency in regions i and j; Ii and Ij are
the levels of innovation in regions i and j; and δi is the geographical network,
defined through the geographical weights matrix.
The efficiency index makes use of structural variables related to regional eco-
nomic systems, such as market size, education, and employment rate. The use
of these variables (Table 1) is helpful in the building of the Competitive network
in order to avoid problems related to endogeneity with the variable QoG, once
this matrix will be used among the other explanatory variables in the model ex-
plaining regional QoG. Variables reflecting the structure of the economies have
been used as a proxy for regional innovativeness. Indeed, the level of patent
application is a proxy for the size of regional high knowledge intensive sectors;
business sophistication accounts for the financial sector and FDI size, while the
technological readiness by firms is given by considering the use of the Internet by
those firms. Moreover, a temporal lag has been used, referring for the measures
of efficiency and innovation to 2010. In Table 1 a list of the variables used for
each proxy 2.
The weight matrix is row standardized after having multiplied the competitive
pressure by the geographical matrix. A limit argued by Neumayer and Plu¨mper
(2012) is that, using a row standardized matrix, the different number of neigh-
bors is not considered on the spatial stimulus. On the contrary, the theoretical
framework underpinning this analysis does not consider each region as equally
exposed to spatial stimulus and not equally responsive. Therefore, the obtained
matrix accounts for different weights and numbers of neighbors thus generating
a spatial lag which consists of a weighted average of neighbors level of QoG.
2 We use data by “EU Regional Competitiveness Index for 2010”. Data and description are
available at the website: http://ec.europa.eu/regional policy/information/focus/index en.cfm
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Fig. 3: Competitive - Imitative Network (competition index within 400 km)
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Tab. 1: Competitive Pressure Index Variables
Sub-Index Sub-Pillar Variables
Efficiency Higher Education and Population 25-64 with higher education;
Lifelong learning;
Lifelong Learning Early school leavers;
Accessibility to universities;
Higher education expenditure.
Labor Market Efficiency Employment rate (excluding agriculture);
Long-term unemployment;
Unemployment;
Labor productivity;
Gender balance unemployment
Gender balance employment;
Female unemployment.
Market Size Gdp index;
Compensation of employees;
Disposable income;
Potential Gdp in PPS;
Potential POP.
Innovation Technological Readiness Households access to broadband;
Individuals buying
over Internet;
Households access to Internet;
Enterprises Internet access;
Enterprises use of websites;
Enterprises use of intranet;
Enterprises use of internal networks;
Employees extranet access;
Employees Internet access.
Business Sophistication Employment in the “Financial intermediation,
real estate, renting and business activities”;
GVA in the “Financial intermediation, real estate,
renting and business activities” sector;
FDI intensity;
Strength of regional clusters.
Innovation Innovation patent applications;
Total patent applications;
Core creative class employment;
Knowledge workers;
Scientific publications.
Source: Dijkstra, Annoni and Kozovska (2011)
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5.2 Dataset
Data for measuring QoG are by Quality of Government Institute of University of
Goteborg. This data come from a survey conducted in the spring of 2013, the
QoG 2013 is drawn on over 84,000 respondents in 212 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2
regions in 24 countries (Charron (2013);Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente (2013)).
The index is composed by several variables proxying the degree of corruption,
the level of quality of public services, the level of impartiality in the public
services3. Table 2 summarizes the independent variables used in the analysis,
while Table 3 shows the summary statistics. Precisely, the Composed Regional
Index used in the analysis has been built following five steps (Charron, 2013):
• a regional indicator for each of the 16 survey questions was built;
• the variables were grouped in three Pillars through a factor analysis;
• the regional index was composed through the pillars;
• the index was weighted by the share of the national population, resulting
in a mean score for each region;
• the weighted regional score was added to the national level by the World
Bank (WGI data) resulting in a regional centered score (adjusted on the
WGI data):
QoGregionXinCountryY = WGIcountryY +(RqogregionXincountryY − CRqogcountryY )
6 Spatial Interaction
6.1 Model Specification
The correct specification for the empirical model used in the analysis has been
chosen accordingly to the theoretical model underpinning it. In order to evaluate
if the model is sufficiently suited to available data, we found helpful to follow
the flow chart proposed by Elhorst (2010):
3 The dataset is available on the website: http://nicholascharron.wordpress.com/european-
quality-of-government-index-eqi/
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- Estimation of a benchmark model (OLS) and calculation of LM tests for
spatial lag and spatial error model;
- Estimate the spatial lag, spatial error model or spatial lag and spatial error
model.
Since the interest is focused on the Spatial Autoregressive model (SAR), this
model is the only one included in the paper, and its significance is shown. The
analysis considers a cross section data set: the dependent variable is referred to
the year 2013, while explanatory variables have been temporarily lagged.
The empirical Spatial Autoregressive Model (SAR) used to estimate the QoG
in European regions is described by the following equation:
QoGi = β0 + ρ
∑
j
wijQoGj + β1logGDPi + β2logPOPi+
+β3logAreai + β4CapitalRegions+ εi
where: QoG is the level of Quality of Government; log Gdp is the log of GDP
per capita; log POP is the log of population; log AREA is the log of the geo-
graphical area; CapitalRegions is a dummy for regions that include the country
capital. The analysis makes use of the Maximum Likelihood Estimation method
to estimate the coefficients. In this case, we give an exogenous structure to the
network of regions. In the equation above, matrix W reflects the Competition
network, i.e. the degree of competitiveness among European regions. The co-
efficient ρ is an estimate of the effect by competition or by learning on levels of
QoG. The intercept is an estimate of the change of QoG not due to competi-
tiveness or to the exogenous independent variables, that is the estimate of the
possibility to be re-elected with an increase of QoG. The analysis assesses the
difference in the power of interaction among leader and lagging regions, and
whether decentralized regions interact more intensely when compared to the
others, as we expect because of their greater freedom in political choices. In
order to verify these hypothesis a model considering different groups of neigh-
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bors is helpful. Differences in the interaction among lagged and leading regions,
and autonomous or not autonomous regions, are accounted by considering the
following model (notation by Allers and Elhorst, 2005):
Y = ρd=1DWY + ρd=0(IN −D)WY + βd=1 + βd=0 +Xβ′ + ε
Where D is a diagonal matrix with no-zero elements equals to the dummy vari-
able d (autonomous/not autonomous and leader/lagging); X represents the
explanatory variables excluding the intercept.
The estimation strategy considered is by Allers and Elhorst (2005):
First Step: Obtain b0, the OLS-estimator of regressing Y on the X variables,
including a different intercept for the two groups defined by the dummy variable
D; Obtain b1 and b2, the OLS-estimators of MWY and (IN −M)WY , re-
spectively, on the X variables, including a different intercept for the two groups
defined by the dummy variable D;
Second Step: Find ρ1 and ρ2 that maximize the concentrated log-likelihood
function of the model, which is:
logLC(ρ1, ρ2) = C −N/2ln[(e0 − ρ1e1 − ρ2e2)′(e0 − ρ1e1 − ρ2e2)]+
ln|IN − ρ1MW − ρ2(IN −M)W |
where C is a constant which may be neglected and e0, e1, and e2 denote the the
regression residuals of the three OLS-regressions. Note that it is not possible to
compute the eigenvalues of the spatial weights matrix W in advance, as is usual
in spatial models, and then to determine the determinant of the last right-hand
side using these eigenvalues;
Third Step: Given ρ1 and ρ2, compute GLS estimator of the spatial lag model:
b = b0− ρ1b1 − ρ2b2
σ2 = 1/N(e0 − ρ1e1 − ρ2e2)′(e0 − ρ1e1 − ρ2e2)
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Fourth Step:Determine the asymptotic variance matrix of the maximum likeli-
hood estimator to obtain standard errors and T-values. This symmetric matrix,
which we derived analytically along the lines in Anselin (1988, pp. 64), is (for
the parameters β, ρ1, ρ2 and σ2, respectively):
1
σ2
X ′X 1
σ2
X ′A1b 1σ2X
′A2b 0
· 1
σ2
b′X ′A′1A1Xb+ tr(A1A1 +A1A
′
1)
1
σ2
b′X ′A′1A2Xb+ tr(A1A2 +A1A
′
2)
1
σ2
tr(A1)
· · 1
σ2
b′X ′A′2A2Xb+ tr(A2A2 +A2A
′
2)
1
σ2
tr(A2)
· · · N
2σ4

where A1 = MWB
−1, A2 = (I−M)WB−1, B = I−ρ1MW −ρ2(I−M)W .
The algorithm has been developed in R starting from Allers and Elhorst matlab
code. Results of this estimation are described in Table 4.
Tab. 2: Exogenous Variables
Variable Source Description
Autonomy Charron (2013) Autonomous decision making units.
Decentralization Hooghe (2010) Index on the degree of regional power
to study homogenous unit of analysis.
Ethnolinguistic LaPorta (1999) Impartiality in public services
related to the degree of
Fractionalization Charron (2009) cultural and ethno fractionalization.
Economic growth Eurostat Key determinant of QoG in literature.
Regional Dimension Eurostat Related to the capacities and difficulties
to mantain a certain level of QoG.
Charron (2013); Charron (2009);
Knack (2002))
Capital Region Charron (2013) Capital regions have
generally a lower level of QoG.
HDI Impact of HDI on QoG with fixed effects.
Social Trust Charron (2013) Strong positive relation among social trust
and the level of QoG (Tabellini, 2010).
Inequality Galbraith (2005) It explains the level of QoG
(Rothstein and Uslaner (2005)
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Tab. 3: Summary Statistics
N Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
QoG 187 0.1996 0.9667 -2.5980 2.7810
Area 188 22280 31487.23 13.4 309900.0
Autonomy 168 0.0892 0.2860 0.0 1.0
Capital Region 170 0.1 0.3008 0.0 1.0
Gdp pc 187 22920 8483.606 6500 54700
HDI 178 56.45 21.144 0.00 94.90
Inequality 129 0.00037 0.0029 -0.0035 0.02504
Population 188 2618000 2498838 28350 17840000
Tab. 4: Spatial regressions explaining quality of government in the Competitive
learning/imitative Network
1 2 3 4 5
Autonomy Region
high low north south
Intercept 1.81 ** -5.01 * -6.27 ** -6.45 ** -5.02 **
(0.51) (1.61) (1.63) (1.62) (1.85)
Ln Gdp 0.67 ** 0.76 ** 0.21 ** 0.70 **
(0.15) (0.15) (0.04) (0.17)
Ln Area 0.04 0.09 ** 0.09 ** 0.06 0.14 **
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Ln Pop -0.10 ** -0.13 ** -0.09 * -0.13 ** -0.19 **
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital -0.12 -0.39 ** -0.53 ** -0.29 ** -0.15
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14) (0.11) (0.13)
Inequality 0.09
(0.11)
ρ 0.39 ** 0.27 ** 0.45 ** 0.26 ** 0.09 ** 0.51 ** 0.25 **
(0.07) (0.07) (0.16) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06)
N 186 185 15 153 93 92 127
Note: All models include country fixed effects (with no intercepts in Model 4
due to perfect multicollinearity with the country fixed effects). * α = 0.10; **
α = 0.05; standard errors in parentheses.
As suggested by LeSage and Pace (2010), the effect of the independent
variables in a region i has a “direct effect” and an “indirect effect” on regions
j. In fact, the spatial dependence in the parameter ρ feeds back. The feedback
of spatial dependence is because the Hessian elements are different from 0. Let’s
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rewrite the equation of a “classic” SAR as follow:
(I− ρW)y = Xβ + ε
∂yi
∂xir
= ((I− ρW)−1Iβr)ij
The average direct impacts are the sum of the diagonal elements of the matrix
((I − ρW)−1Iβr) divided by N for each variable. The average total impacts
are the sum of all matrix elements divided by N for each variable. The average
indirect impacts are the differences between the direct and total impacts. The
direct and indirect effects obtained from the model 2 are reported in Table 6.
In Table 4 and Table 5 we show results relatively to models built to answer
Tab. 5: Direct and Indirect Impact
Model Impact Ln Gdp Ln Pop Ln Area Capital Inequality
1
Direct -0.09 0.04 -0.12
Indirect -0.06 0.03 0.07
2
Direct 0.66 -0.13 0.09 -0.39
Indirect 0.25 -0.05 0.03 -0.14
3
Direct 0.76 -0.09 0.09 -0.53
Auto. Ind 0.62 -0.07 0.07 0.70
No Auto. Ind 0.26 -0.03 0.03 0.66
4
Direct 0.21 -0.13 0.06 -0.29
North Ind 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.36
South Ind 0.22 -0.13 0.06 0.41
5
Direct 0.69 -0.18 0.14 -0.14 0.08
Indirect 0.23 -0.06 0.05 -0.05 0.03
to the first hypothesis in particular, and partially to the third one in the case
of learning/imitating competition network. As hypothesized, the European re-
gions, when considering the competitive learning/imitating, are “strategic com-
plements”.
Wealth (as log of Gdp) is commonly assumed to explain quality of institutions
(Chong and Zanforlin, 2000; La Porta et al., 1999), but this relation is also
thought to be reverse (Hall and Jones, 1999; Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi,
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2004). In order to reduce the possible endogeneity, we temporally lag the log
Gdp to 2010. Moreover, we run a model where log Gdp is absent (model 2).
Spatial Interaction is stronger when we do not consider Gdp, but it is equally
evident a positive and strong spatial interaction among levels of QoG as when
controlling for Gdp. Then, we may conclude that Gdp does not influence our
analysis. Moreover, as “control” variables, we use the regional demographic
factors such as Area and Population. Knack (2002) shows how larger states in
US states have higher-quality administration. Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente
(2013) do not find a robust relation between levels of QoG and dimension of re-
gions in terms of population when they do not consider the country fixed effect.
Instead, when controlling for country fixed effect, they find that more populous
regions have lower QoG, while larger regions in terms of Area have a higher
QoG. This results are confirmed by our analysis in all the models. Moreover,
as Charron and Lapuente (2013), we verify that capital regions are negatively
associated with level of QoG.
In model 3 and 4 we consider the differences in spatial interaction between
autonomous and not autonomous regions, and among northern and southern
regions. Our results indicate that autonomous regions interact more each other
in their levels of QoG. This evidences that regions having freedom in manag-
ing their administration, have an higher capacity to interact in the levels of
QoG. If we think in terms of costs, our results underline autonomous regions
have less political costs in rising their level of QoG. Furthermore, northern re-
gions (regions by the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom)
are much lower interacting compared to the southern ones (regions by the fol-
lowing countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain). This may be explained by the fact
that in a “vicious” environment the learning and the imitation is very high
compared to the north, since the regional administrations have a structure that
does not permit them to be “independent” by the surrounding environment.
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Contrarily, the northern regions have a solid QoG that does not receive much
stimulus by the external environment when considering the learning/imitative
competition network. Model 5 confirms the results by models 1 and 2, when
adding the variable ‘Inequality’. It is considered as a check for the validity of
our conclusions.
Following Ward and Gleditsch (2008), let’s rewrite the equation of the “classic”
SAR as follow:
(I− ρW)y = Xβ + ε
In equilibrium, the expected value for y will be:
E(y) = (I− ρW)−1Xβ
We are going to show the short term impact of a change of QoG in region i
to (then not a change in the systematic part of the model) the level of QoG of
regions j being neigbors with i. The short term impact depends by ρˆ and by
the particular structure of W . In our case, we are going to measure the impact
of a change in QoG in region i on regions that are actually affected, through
the competitive network, to region i. In figure 4 we show two examples of this
impact, while the values of impacts are shown on Tables 6 and 7. Our first
example is East England (UKH) with a QoG of 1.761. It affects 16 regions
in UK, Netherlands, Belgium, France. It is evident how UKH does not affect
UK3, even if it is a neighbor. This is due to the fact that UK3 is more efficient
compared to UKH, then enterprises will not move from UK3 to UKH (but the
contrary). Then, the UKH administration will not react to a raise in the Quality
of Government of UKH. When considering the estimated spatial interaction only
among northern region (Model 4, figure 4 on the left), the impact on neighbors
is lower compared to the general impact (Model 1, figure 4 on the right). The
second example considers the region with the lowest value of QoG of our sample:
Yugozapaden-BG41 in Bulgaria, with a QoG of -2.598. If Yugozapaden had an
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QoG of 2.781, regions having competitive pressure to go to Yugozapaden will
be very low affected. Ten regions of three countries (Bulgaria, Greece and Ro-
mania) have competitive pressure towards Yugozapaden, and consequently are
affected by a change of QoG in this region. Since W is row standardized, less
is the number of neighbors towards whom a region has competitive pressure,
bigger will be the impact by a change of the neighbors. With a change in BG41
of 5.379 in its level of QoG, the bigger impact is of 0.468 in GR1, that has
a competitive pressure towards three regions. The lowest impact is on BG31
(0.062) that has a competitive impact towards 12 regions. Considering the
spatial interaction estimated through the model 4, these impacts are evidently
higher due to the higher estimated ρ. This is the picture of a mechanism of
Tab. 6: Short Term Impact East England (UKH) to QoG = 2.781
Region Code Name Country Impact QoG
UKG West Midland England England 0.133 0.054 0.655
NL23 Flevoland Netherlands 0.093 0.038 1.277
UKD Northwest England England 0.093 0.038 0.853
UKE Yorkshire-Humber England 0.093 0.038 0.936
UKF East Midland England England 0.089 0.036 0.689
BE2 Vlaams Gewest Belgium 0.085 0.034 1.318
UKL Wales England 0.085 0.035 0.389
UKK South West England England 0.081 0.033 0.522
NL12 Friesland (NL) Netherlands 0.059 0.024 1.428
FR22 Picardie France 0.057 0.023 0.403
UKC Northeast England England 0.045 0.018 0.705
NL34 Zeeland Netherlands 0.043 0.017 1.257
FR23 Haute-Normandie France 0.042 0.017 0.466
FR30 Nord - Pas-de-Calais France 0.040 0.016 0.286
BE3 Wallonie Belgium 0.039 0.016 0.161
FR25 Basse-Normandie France 0.037 0.015 0.855
virtous and viciuos cycles. Then, a policy implication is to push for stronger
relations among low QoG regions, making some macro regional policies able to
give omogeneity to the entire economy developing cooperation and competition
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Fig. 4: Short term Equilibrium Impact of a change of QoG to the maximum
value on neighbors
Tab. 7: Short Term Impact of Yugozapaden QoG = 2.781
Region Code Name Country Impact QoG
Model 1 Model 4
GR1 Voreia Ellada Greece 0.468 0.584 -0.906
BG42 Yuzhen Tsentralen Bulgaria 0.445 0.555 -0.940
GR2 Kentriki Ellada Greece 0.423 0.527 -0.980
RO42 Vest Romania 0.250 0.311 -1.591
BG34 Yugoiztochen Bulgaria 0.176 0.220 -1.592
RO31 Sud-Muntenia Romania 0.163 0.203 -1.478
BG32 Severen Tsentralen Bulgaria 0.161 0.200 -1.391
RO41 Sud-Vest Oltenia Romania 0.082 0.102 -1.659
BG33 Severoiztochen Bulgaria 0.072 0.090 -0.111
BG31 Severozapaden Bulgaria 0.062 0.078 -2.020
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stimulating innovation in the policies and an higher level of QoG.
In Table 8 the results of models for the pure competitive network. The specifi-
Tab. 8: Spatial regressions explaining quality of government in a Pure Compe-
tition Network
6 7 8 9 10
Autonomy Region
high low north south
Intercept 2.61 ** -6.67 ** -7.50 ** -7.84 ** -7.06 **
(0.61) (1.84) (1.70) (1.68) ( 2.17)
Log Gdp 0.86 ** 0.91 ** 0.27 ** 0.90 **
(0.17) (0.05) (0.19)
Log Area 0.03 0.09 ** 0.10 ** 0.06 0.16 **
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Log Pop -0.19 ** -0.12 ** -0.09 * -0.20 ** -0.22 **
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Capital -0.40 ** -0.65 ** -0.65 ** -0.37 ** -0.24
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14) (0.16)
Inequality 0.14
(0.13)
ρ 0.98 ** 0.37 -0.66 0.23 ** 0.70 ** 0.26 0.58
(0.06) (0.18) (0.27) (0.08) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19)
N 167 167 15 152 93 74 109
Note: All models include country fixed effects (with no intercepts in Model 9
due to perfect multicollinearity with the country fixed effects). * α = 0.10; **
α = 0.05; standard errors in parentheses. N here is limited compared to Models
in Table 4 since we eliminate those observations with no neighbors.
cation of these models aims to answer to hypothesis 2 and partially to hypothesis
3. These models consider a pure competition network where each region com-
petes with the others on the base of competitive network, as shown in sub
section 5.1, and on the geographical distance, assuming that competition is
higher with a geographical neighbor. In this case, the spatial autocorrelation is
not independent by the wealth variable. When considering log Gdp per capita
in model 7, the effect of spatial autocorrelation disappears. This effects, in-
stead, is present in model 8 and 9 when taking separately autonomous and not
autonomous and northern and southern regions. It means that the spatial au-
tocorrelation is present also when controlling for Gdp per capita, but the effect
is visible only in some regions. In particular, in the model 8 is shown the lack
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of spatial effect among autonomous regions. They are indifferent, when con-
sidering a pure competition network, to the QoG of neighbors. The contrary
happens for the no autonomous ones. In model 9 we observe a result completely
different compared to the competitive learning/imitating network. In fact, in
the case of pure competition Northern regions affect much each other, while the
southern are independently behaving. This may say that, when the mechanism
of pure competition is considered, the northern regions are ready to react to the
spatial stimulus. On the other hand, southern regions do not compete much
each other, but only within a restricted network (as shown previously in model
4).
6.2 Non linearities in the spatial trends of QoG diffusion
In order to verify nonlinearities in the exogenous variables used in the estimation
of QoG (hypothesis 4), we adopt a Spatial Autoregressive Semiparametric Model
by Basile and Gress (2004) and Basile, Capello and Caragliu (2012):
yi = X
∗
iβ
∗ + ρ
n∑
j
wijyj + f1(x1i) + f2(x2i) + f3(x3i, x4,i)+
+f4(x1i)li + · · ·+ h(noi; ei) + εi
where ε ∼ iidN(0, σ2ε) and
∑n
j wijyj and ε are correlated. Therefore, the
analysis uses a “control function” approach by Basile (2009) and Blundell and
Powell (2003), where the first equation is:
n∑
j=1
wijyi = X∗i + f1(x1i) + f2(x2i) + f3(x3i, x4,i) + f4(x1i)li+
+ · · ·+ h(noi; ei) +
∑
m
gm(Qmi) + vi
In this equation
∑
m gm(Qmi) are a set of instruments, that in line with Kele-
jian and Prucha (1998), is an intercept, all exogenous terms included in the
model and spatial lags; vi a set of random variables satisfying conditional mean
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restrictions E(vi|Qi) = 0.
The second step consists of estimating an additive model of the form:
yi = X
∗
ibeta
∗ + ρ
n∑
j
wijyj + f1(x1i) + f2(x2i) + f3(x3i, x4,i)+
+f4(x1i)li + · · ·+ h(noi; ei) + c(vˆi) + εi
Finally, it is important to note that endogeneity problems due to omitted vari-
ables (i.e. missing permanent characteristics that drive both the response vari-
able and the covariates) can be ruled out by directly controlling for the effect
of “first nature” characteristics including the smooth interaction between lati-
tude and longitude of the regional units of analysis. Similar algorithms for the
semiparametric SAR model are defined. Specifically, the total effect of variable
xk is computed as:
fˆekk (xk) =
∑
q
[In − ρˆWn]−1ij bkq(xk)βˆkq
Finally, direct and indirect (or spillover) effects of smooth terms in semipara-
metric SAR is computed as follows:
fˆdekk (xk) =
∑
q
[In − ρˆWn]−1ii bkq(xk)βˆkq
fˆ iekk (xk) = fˆ
tek
k (xk)− fˆdekk (xk)
On Table 9 are shown results by the geo−additive model. The edf shows
that Gdp has a non linear effect on the QoG, as we hypothesized. In particular,
looking at the figure 5, it is noticeable that the effect of the wealth variable on
the levels of QoG is characterized by two humps. Gdp affects positively QoG
at a low level of wealth, but the effect decreases and becomes negative around
the first quartile. The effect is again strongly positive around the median and
then again negative around the third quartile. Our hypothesis of a stronger
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Tab. 9: Direct and Indirect Impact
Nonparametric terms
F test p-value edf
f ( log Gdp) 6.501 8.04e-05 3.866
f ( log Area) 4.240 0.032217 1.155
f (log Population) 25.836 1.12e-06 1.000
f (no;e) 2.883 0.000985 10.337
f (vˆ) 36.018 1.39e-08 1.000
Parametric terms
Coeff. p-value
W γy 0.9094 2.63e-07
Capital Region -0.2945 0.00925
Diagnostics and goodness of fit
R2 − adj 0.925
Deviance 94.1%
GCV score 0.092698
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Fig. 5: Semiparametric spatial lag model: Estimated smooth functions as the
effect of Gdp per capita
Note: Solid lines represent smooth functions of each term, alongside Bayesian
confidence intervals (shaded grey areas) at the 95 percent level of significance.
In each plot, the vertical axis displays the scale of the estimated smooth func-
tion, while the horizontal ones report the scale of each determinant. Rug plot
along the horizontal axis represents observed data (Basile, Capello and Caragliu,
2012).
effect of Gdp at a low level of wealth is not confirmed. We find something more
complex. In figure 6 and 7 are shown the effects of the demographic variables
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Fig. 6: Semiparametric spatial lag model: Estimated smooth functions as the
effect of Population
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Fig. 7: Semiparametric spatial lag model: Estimated smooth functions as the
effect of Area
(Population and Area) on the level of QoG. It is noticeable as the effects are
pretty much linear: the raise of population affects negatively the level of QoG,
while the geographical dimension of a region affect positively the level of QoG.
Figure 8 displays the effect of the smooth interaction between latitude and lon-
gitude, f(no, e). It can be observed that, ceteris paribus, some Eastern and
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Fig. 8: Semiparametric spatial lag model: Estimated smooth interaction func-
tion of longitude and latitude
Note: Each circle in the plot, centered at the regional centroids, is propor-
tional to the effect of the smooth interaction term f(no; e) (Basile, Capello
and Caragliu, 2012).
some South-Western regions have higher predicted QoG. This means that the
model does not consider some factors (omitted variables /not observed hetero-
geneity) , that are instead got by the f(no, e) factor.
7 Conclusions
Interest in Quality of Government is increasing in the fields of political science
and economics. Several studies have been conducted in order to assess the qual-
ity of institutions, determining the key factors affecting those institutions and
the diffusion at country level. A wide literature has focused on the determinants
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of QoG at regional level in Europe, but no study has been conducted on the spa-
tial diffusion of QoG. This paper studies the spatial diffusion of QoG at regional
level in Europe. Data are collected by the Quality of Government Institute on
2013. Following the literature on policy diffusion, several hypothesis have been
formulated on the mechanisms of interaction among regional governments for
their level of QoG. The focus is on the competitive interaction distinguishing
two kind of mechanisms: a competitive learning/imitating mechanism and a
pure competitive one.
The two mechanisms are differentiated by two competitive networks distinguish-
able by the different geographical limitations considered. In fact, to study the
competitive learning/imitating mechanism, the research makes use of a compet-
itive network which considers only the closer geographical neighbors, assuming
that imitation and learning is a process in place exclusively among geographi-
cal neighbors. On the contrary, when considering a pure competitive network,
geographical proximity in terms of distance affects the scope of the influence
exerted by the regional levels of QoG, since competition is assumed to be higher
between closer neighbors, even if the mechanism is in place among all the Eu-
ropean regions.
The research has found evidence of a strong spatial interaction in the competitive
learning/imitating mechanism among levels of QoG in European regions, with
a stronger autocorrelation in autonomous regions and southern regions. When
considering the pure competitive mechanism, a large autocorrelation among
northern regions and not autonomous ones has been found to exist. This re-
sults show that “leader” regions (those with an high QoG), corresponding to
northern regions, do react to changes in QoG levels when they are competing
economically, but they are not very sensitive to changes of restricted geographi-
cal neighbors, as in the case of learning/imitating mechanism. On the contrary,
southern regions are very sensitive to the influence exerted by those competitors
that are very close geographically. This indicates that these regions have an
higher propensity to learn from their neighbors. Finally, it has been shown how
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the influence by the wealth (Gdp) on QoG is not linear. Such effect is indeed
characterized by two humps: with a huge influence at very low/high levels of
Gdp per capita. In conclusion, this research shows how the spatial interaction
among regions in their level of QoG is a very complex process, where several
mechanisms in place have heterogeneous effects on space. Therefore, when
studying the spatial diffusion of QoG it is important to make a distinction both
among groups of regions and among mechanisms of diffusion.
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Appendix A: Quality of Government Institute Dataset Corruption
− EdCor:region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent to
which corruption persists in the education system in the region/area
− HelCor: region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent to
which corruption persists in the health care system in the region/area
− LawCor: region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent to
which corruption persists in the law enforcement in the region/area
− OthersCorr : region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent
to which respondents felt other citizens in the region/area use bribery to
obtain public services
− HelBribe: region’s aggregated score from survey question asking whether
the respondents were forced to pay a bribe in the last 12 months to obtain
any health care in the region/area
− Corrupt: The aggregated regional score for EdCorr, HelCorr, LawCorr,
OthersCorr and Helbribe
Inequally treatment in public services
− EdImpart1: region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent
to which certain people receive special advantages in public education
− HelImpart1: region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent
to which certain people receive special advantages in public health care
− LawImpart1: region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent
to which certain people receive special advantages from law enforcement
− EdImpart2: region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent
to which all citizens are treated equally in public education
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− HelImpart2 region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent
to which all citizens are treated equally in public health services
− LawImpart2 region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent
to which all citizens are treated equally by law enforcement
− Impart: The aggregated regional score for EdImpart1, EdImpart2, He-
lImpart1, HelImpart2, LawIMpart1 and LawIMpart2 (equal weighting)
Quality of Public Services
− EdQual: region’s aggregated score from survey question on quality of
public education in region/area
− HelEq: region’s aggregated score from survey question on quality of public
health care in region/area
− LawEq: region’s aggregated score from survey question on quality of law
enforcement in region/area
− Election: region’s aggregated score from survey question on the extent to
which corruption persists in regional elections
− Media: region’s aggregated score from survey question on likelihood of
media reporting corruption in public sector or by politicians in the re-
gion/area
− Quality: The aggregated regional score of Edqual, HelQual, Lawqual,
Media and Election (equal weighting)
Aggregate Indices
− RegQoG: The combined score from Quality, Impart and Corruption (equal
weighting)
− Margin: The margin of error constructed around the regional QoG esti-
mate
− NatregQoG: The national average for each country in the regional survey
(weighted by each region’s population)
− QoG: The full, combined composite QoG index score for each country and
region
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Specialization and Land Productivity
A Spatial Analysis of Italian Provinces
Abstract
This paper aims to analyse the effect of specialization on land productivity in Italian
agriculture. Using a relative measure of specialization (Location Quotient or Balassa
Index), the analysis first assesses changes occurred in the specialization of sown crops
during a period of ten years, using data by agricultural censuses on 2000 and 2010
by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The general evidence is the tendency
to increase specialization mostly in all groups of crops. Classical methods for an Ex-
ploratory Spatial Data Analysis, such as global Moran’s I and local Moran’s I statistics,
spatial correlograms and Moran’s I scatterplot, are used to analyse spatial autocor-
relation among provinces in their specialization in main crop groups, the presence of
influential provinces and clusters and hotspots. Through a spatial model for panel
data, the research demonstrates the impacts of specialization on productivity is het-
erogeneous among groups of crops. Specialization is an enhancer for land productivity
in olives, grapes and industrial crops. On the contrary, specialization affects negatively
land productivity in cereals, citrus fruit and fruits. Diversification in sown crops results
significant and positive for land productivity when cultivating grapes, while the effect
is negative on the productivity for cereals.
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1 Introduction
Sectoral specialization by economies is a key issue in the debate around eco-
nomic growth and productivity within regional science. Since the seminal study
by Krugman (1991), several researches have been conducted on sectoral spe-
cialization of regional economies in Europe. Economic geography theory has
explained the mechanism of industrial agglomeration highlighting the benefits
that it produces in terms of reduced costs and improved demand linkages (Fu-
jita, 1988; Krugman, 1990; Venables, 1996) assuming increasing returns to scale
by technology and imperfect competition. Positive externalities by agglomera-
tion might derive from the knowledge spillovers and the process of cumulative
innovation (Marshall et al., 1920; Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993). Two differ-
ent typologies of externalities have been identified in literature: MAR (Mar-
shall, Arrows, and Romer) externalities, and Jacobs’ externalities (Rosenthal
and Strange, 2004; Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009). They have been empiri-
cally associated with specialization and diversification economies respectively.
The Marshall-Arrow-Romer (MAR) model (Glaeser et al., 1991) is based on
the idea that the concentration of a specific industry or sector in a region en-
hances knowledge spillovers between firms, therefore facilitating innovation in
that industry within that region. Specialization encourages knowledge, ideas
and information diffusion in such area (Saxenian, 1996). Furthermore, spe-
cialisation in certain productions provides countries with a set of capabilities
that constrains technological diversification to related products (Hidalgo et al.,
2007). Indeed, an indispensable requirement for the MAR model externalities
to occur is that firms have to belong to the same or related sector. This is why
this typology of externalities is referred to as the specialization externalities.
On the other hand, Jacobs’ externalities are usually associated to (highly diver-
sified) urban contexts, and are referred as diversification externalities. Starting
from this classification, we focus on the relation among externalities and pro-
ductivity. Several empirical researches have been conducted aiming to analyse
106
the relation between innovation and productivity with specialization and di-
versification taking into account industrial sectors or the entire economy of a
place. As underlined by Iammarino and McCann (2006), it is important to ob-
serve the cluster under analysis having a precise idea of the kind of relations
there are within the cluster, since the evolutionary process of different clusters
may be different. The agriculture production has particular characteristics com-
pared to other sectors due to the protectionism agricultural policies (concept
of ‘food regimes’ by Friedmann, 1993 and McMichael, 2005). The agri-food
sector is interesting because, as Ward and Alma˚s (1997) highlight, despite the
“transformation and industrialization of capitalist agriculture, the rising power
of multinational food and agribusiness corporations and the global integration
of the agri-food system”, it is defined by ‘heterogeneity at the local level’. The
Italian industrial districts in the agri-food sector are characterized by ‘quality’
and ‘typicality’ due to strong regional gastronomic traditions, that limit imita-
tion (Brasili and Fanfani, 2010). Nevertheless, these features do not prevent
from external competition: only those districts that do not have a standard-
ized production, instead presenting a more dynamic organization and links with
high quality and specific territories, are well facing the global market (Foresti
and Micelli, 2007). Currently, an empirical study focusing on externalities by
agglomeration and their effect on productivity is missing within the primary
sector. This research aims to fill the gap: after providing some insights on the
importance of clusters in agriculture in section two, section three presents an
index of specialization (as a Location Quotient) and an index of diversification
(as Herfindahl Index) of the 110 Italian provinces for 8 main crop groups. More-
over, the classical indexes for an Explanatory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) are
shown. Underlying the differences in the spatial autocorrelation among 2000
and 2010, using census data by the Italian National Institute of Statistics (IS-
TAT), section three focuses on a descriptive analysis of changes occurred in the
Italian agriculture of the new millennium. Finally, section four is devoted to the
analysis of the effects of specialization and diversification on productivity within
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each main crop group.
2 Spatial Characteristics of Specialization
Following Marrocu, Paci and Usai (2013), this analysis uses a location quotient
(the quota of UAA employed in a province relative to the Italian share) for
measuring the relative specialization in the main crop groups in Italian provinces.
The Location Quotient or Balassa Index captures both the relative importance
and the intensity of a particular production. For province i (out of 110 provinces)
and crop j (within a set of 8 crop groups), the specialization index based on
UAA is defined as:
SPEij =
Lij/
∑
j Lij∑
i Lij/
∑
i
∑
j Lij
(1)
This index is useful in order to avoid the problem of the measurement-induced
spatial heterogeneity (Haining, 2003) because it controls for the territorial di-
mension of each province.
From Tukey (1977):
x(s) = m(s) + ε
where x(s) is the crop sown; m(s) is the large scale variation (smooth); ε is the
small scale variation (rough).
The spatial data x(s) can be partitioned in two components: m(s) and ε. The
former describes the variation of the spatial data in relation to a larger spatial
context (it can be provincial, regional, national etc.), and it is the predictable
part of the data, whilst the latter is the unpredictable part (Haining, 2003).
It describes the variation of spatial data in the small context of our precise
observation. In order to analyse the spatial trends and to point out spatial
homogeneity, it is quite important to disentangle the variation of a large scale
from the variation in a small context.
By assessing m(s), it may be possible to point out the natural vocation of
the land that should apply across the province, and which in turn is linked to
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the crop sown in provinces. In order to estimate the smooth part, the analysis
makes use of the queen-contiguity matrix, with a first order of contiguity as
spatial weighted matrix for considering the natural vocation of a province land
that is similar to the neighbors provinces. In the case of agriculture, in which
climate is the key factor to decide what kind of cultivation to invest on, we
consider necessary to focus on the contiguity weights matrix. In this context,
the “islands” problem (unconnected observations) is not encountered (Anselin,
2003).
Fig. 1: Queen Contiguity Network
In order to verify the presence and the location of clusters of specialization
in the sown crops, an exploratory spatial data analysis is conducted here using
the Moran’s I (global) and LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Association - local
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Moran’s I) indices. The Moran’s I is a global indicator used to test the presence
of global spatial autocorrelation:
I =
(
N∑
i
∑
j wij
)(∑
j
∑
iwij(xi − x¯)(xj − x¯)∑
i(xi − x¯)2
)
where xi is the ith observation, x¯ is the mean of the variable of interest, and
wij is the spatial weight of the link between i and j (Bivand, Pebesma and
Go´mez-Rubio, 2008). The null Hypothesis supports the absence of spatial au-
tocorrelation Haining (2003). If the index value is higher than the expected one
(equal to −1/(N − 1)) , there is positive autocorrelation. If the value is below
the expected one, this means that there is a negative autocorrelation. The sig-
nificance of the global statistic of spatial autocorrelation (Moran’s I) is assessed
asymptotically or by approximation (Anselin, 1995). As common, Moran’s I is
considered normally distributed (approximation). The spatial autocorrelation
can be assessed by the Moran’s I scatterplot, where we can observe a positive
spatial dependence (high-high and low-low) in the first and in the third quad-
rant, and a negative autocorrelation in the second and in the fourth quadrant
(high-low and low-high). The Moran’s scatterplot represents the standardized
variable (variable menus mean and divided by the standard deviation) on the
axis X, while the lagged variable is on the Y axis. The coefficient gives the mea-
sure of the linear association between a province and the contiguous neighbors.
The same result of the Moran’s I is obtained by an OLS regression, taking as
independent variable the variable of interest and as lagged one as dependent.
Then, it is possible to detect observations with an unusual strong influence on
the slope, and assess if particular local relationships influence more than pro-
portionally the slope (Bivand, Pebesma and Go´mez-Rubio, 2008). The Moran’s
I calculated for each crop group gives the presence of spatial autocorrelation.
As underlined by Bivand, Pebesma and Go´mez-Rubio (2008), the global
tests for spatial autocorrelation may be divided in their local components, ob-
taining local tests for spatial autocorrelation. This is because the global tests
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are constructed assessing the local relationships between an observation and its
neighbors. The Local Moran I (Anselin, 1995) provides information regarding
where clusters (observations with very similar neighbors) and hotspots (obser-
vations with very different neighbors) are, and their significance. It decomposes
Moran’s I coefficients in local values. The local form of Moran’s I is a product
of the zone value and the average in the surrounding zones (Anselin, 1995):
Ii(d) =
(xi − x¯)
∑
j wij(xj − x¯)∑
i(xi − x¯)2/N
where we assume the global mean x¯ is an adequate representation of the variable
of interest y. E(Ii) = −wi/(N−1), wi =
∑
j wij , with j 6= i; V ar(Ii) = w2i V ,
with V the variance of I under randomization. The sum of local Moran is
proportional to the global Moran’s I. The local Moran is equal to the product
of the variable in our province and neighboring provinces variable divided by the
variance of the variable on our province. The LISA null hypothesis supports
the absence of spatial clustering in the province under analysis. In order to
evaluate the significance of the local Moran for each province, the local statistics
are tested for divergence by expected values using Saddlepoint approximation.
As underlined by Bivand, Pebesma and Go´mez-Rubio (2008), this method is
important when the number of neighbors for wach observation is small, and the
adoption of normality assumption is problematic. Following Waller and Gotway
(2004), since the probability values are not adjusted for multiple comparisons,
the probability values are interpreted as indications. Values that are close to
zero indicate clusters characterized by positive local autocorrelation, while values
close to unity indicate negative local autocorrelation.
The Moran’s I and LISA are calculated on the Specialization Index of Italian
provinces considering 8 main crop groups (cereals, citrus fruit, fresh fruit, grapes,
olives, industrial crops, vegetables in open fields, greenhouse vegetables). We
are going to show changes in Italian agriculture specialization in relation to the
eighth most important crop groups. Moreover, we show Moran’s I and local
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Moran’s I statistics for the main crop groups. Between 2000 and 2010, the
dynamic in the use of land in agriculture is characterized by a reduction of UAA
in crop production of 7.78 % in Italy. Looking at the sectors, the UAA reduced
of 10.62 % in production of Cereals, of 7.39 % in Grapes, of 2.74 % in Citrus
Fruit, of 14.8 % in Fruits, and finally of 32.91 % in industrial crops. On the
contrary, the increase of UAA is for the production of olives (5.33 %), open field
vegetables (12.63 %) and in the greenhouse vegetables production (46.6 %).
This raise has not been equal in all the territory and it is evident a particular
difference among the different geographical areas of the Country. The province
with the higher increase in UAA for production of crops is Belluno-ITD33 with
an increase of 12.7 % of UAA (from 3168.87 to 3571.71 hectares), while the
province with the biggest decrease is Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (ITC14) with a
decrease of 52.04 % of UAA (from 530.93 hectares in 2000 to 254.65 hectare in
2010). In general, the dimension of enterprises in Italy raised of 54.6 % between
2000 and 2010: from 1.88 hectares per enterprise to 2.91 hectares per enterprise.
The bigger increase has been done in Belluno - ITD33 with an increase of 5.7
times between 2000 and 2010 (from 0.42 hectares per enterprise in 2000 to 2.39
in 2010). The biggest reduction happened in Verbano-Cusio-Ossola - ITC14
with a reduction of 1.4 times in the dimension of enterprises (from 1.17 to 0.84
hectares per enterprise between 2000 and 2010). Beyond Verbano-Cusio-Ossola,
only other three provinces reduced the dimension of enterprises (Lecco, Como
and Varese). The province with the lowest dimension of enterprises in Aosta
- ITC20 both in 2000 than in 2010, with 0.20 hectares per enterprise in 2000
and 0.34 in 2010. The province with the highest dimension in 2000 and 2010 is
Vercelli - ITC12, with 22.41 hectares per enterprise in 2000 and 30.04 in 2010.
2.1 Cereals
In figure 2 the location quotient statistic is shown for Cereals in 2000 and
2010. The hectares dedicated to cereals are 4049741 in 2000 and 3619477 in
2010. The UAA used for Cereals is increased 27.65 times in Imperia-ITC31 (IM)
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between the 2000 and 2010 (from 3.98 hectares to 110.07 hectares), and the
maximum reduction in Massa Carrara - ITE11 (MS) of 2.85 times (from 486.74
to 170.78 hectares). The province with the largest amount of UAA used for
Cereals is Foggia - ITF41 (FG) with 291935.6 hectares in 2000 and 254693.7
hectares in 2010. Within the production of cereals, the dimension of enterprises
at Italian level increases of 1.4 times: it was of 5.32 hectares per enterprise
in 2000 and 7.65 in 2010. The province with the largest UAA dedicated to
cereals (Foggia - ITF41) both in 2000 and 2010 shows an enterprise dimension
of 9.9 hectares in average in 2000 (29492 enterprises for 291935.6 hectares),
while in 2010 the average dimension is of 10.7 hectares per enterprise (23775
enterprises for 254693.7 hectares). Foggia has a location quotient equal to 1.3
in 2000 and 1.2 in 2010, meaning that it is 1.2 times more specialized in cereals
in 2000 and 1.3 times in 2010. Within cereals specialization the province with
bigger enterprises is Vercelli - ITC12 (VC) with 34.17 hectares per enterprise in
2000 (2479 enterprises for 84700.42 hectares) and 47.53 hectares in 2010 (1841
enterprises for 87509.57 hectares). Vercelli is the most specialized province in
cereals, with a location quotient for 2000 equal to 1.7 and 1.8 in 2010, that
means that it is mostly 2 times more specialized in cereals than the whole
country. The province with the lowest dimension is Genova-ITC33 (GE) with
0.13 hectare per enterprise in 2000 (440 enterprises for 57.78 hectares) and
0.26 in 2010 (195 enterprises for 50.73 hectares). Then, the province with
the biggest growth in the dimension within cereals is Imperia with an increase
of 35.26 times: from 0.26 hectare per enterprise in 2000 (15 enterprises for
3.98 hectares) to 9.17 hectares per enterprise in 2010 (12 enterprises for 110.07
hectares).
In the upper part of figure 3 we observe the spatial autocorrelation for higher
orders of neighbors in 2000 and 2010 for cereals. It shows the Moran’s I statistic
when considering different orders of neighbors, from the first order the the sixth
one. It is noticeable that the Moran’s I statistic is very high (0.3) compared to
other neighbour contiguity order. Then we may conclude that there is positive
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Fig. 2: Cereals Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the right
spatial autocorrelation in cereals only among the first order contiguity provinces.
In other words, the spatial influence for the specialization in cereals is only ob-
servable among contiguous provinces. In the lower part of the graph, we show
the significance of the Moran I statistic considering the distance among neigh-
bors. Moran’s I statistic is significant only when considering neighbors within
a distance band of 0-10, 30-40 and 40-50 km. Coherently, only the Moran’s I
statistic referred to the first contiguity matrix is significant.
In figure 4 we may observe the Moran scatter-plot on the left and a map with
the influential provinces on the right, in the case of the location quotient re-
ferred to cereals. On the upper part of the figure we show those statistics for
the year 2000, while in the lower part for 2010. Looking at the scatter-plot,
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Fig. 3: Cereals Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
we see the most influential provinces named. In particular, these observations
are those that influence more than proportionally the slope of the Moran statis-
tic. In fact, since “global Moran’s I is a linear relationship, we can also apply
standard techniques for detecting observations with unusually strong influence
on the slope. Specifically, we show the slope coefficient of the linear model of
(wx ∼ x), where wx is the spatially lagged value of x. This means that we can
see whether particular local relationships are able to influence the slope more
than proportionally. The map in the right panel shows tracts with significant
influence (using standard criteria) coded by their quadrant in the Moran scatter-
plot” (Bivand, Pebesma and Go´mez-Rubio, 2008). In particular, we see that a
high specialization with a high spatial autocorrelation is observable for Vercelli
(VC), then this province is characterized by a High - high relation with his con-
tiguous neighbours. On the contrary, Aosta (AO) and Verbano-Cusio-Ossola
(VB) are characterized by a low specialization but they have neighbours with
high specialization. That means they have a high-low relation with their con-
tiguous neighbours. Napoli (NA), Genova (GE), Bolzano (BZ), Imperia (IM),
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Vibo Valentia (VV), Trieste (TS) are characterized by a low-low relation with
their neighbours: have a low specilization as their neighbours. Finally, Crotone
(KR) has a high-low relation with its neighbours, since the neighbours special-
ization is very small compared to the one in Crotone. The global Moran’s I in
2000 is equal to 0.29.
In 2010 the figure shows some changes compared to 2000: Verbano-Cusio-
Ossola (VB) is characterized by a high-high relation, and Crotone (KR) and
Genova (GE) do not result more influential on the definition of the Global
Moran’s I. The global Moran’s I is equal to 0.36 in 2010, with an increase of
the global spatial autocorrelation compared to 2000 in terms of specialization.
Fig. 4: Cereals Specialization and Moran I
In figure 5 clusters and hotspots are detected. It is evident a differentiation
among the north and the south of the country. A high specialized cluster is
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detected among a considerable number of northern provinces. Instead, on the
south of Italy there are only clusters of low specialized provinces.
Fig. 5: Cereals Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the left; 2010 on
the right
2.2 Olives
In figure 6 it is shown the location quotient statistic for olives in 2000 and 2010.
Italy dedicates 1066396 hectares olive production in 2000 and 1123330 hectares
in 2010. The UAA used for olives has been increased 469 times in Belluno -
ITD33 (BL) (from 0.05 hectares in 2000 to 23.45 hectares in 2010); it decreased
of 3.12 times in Pavia-ITC48 (PV) (from 64.4 to 20.65 hectares). The province
with the larger UAA in olives is Lecce - ITF45 (LE) with 83822 hectares in
2000 and 97329 hectares in 2010. It has a specialization index equal to 4.16 in
117
2 Spatial Characteristics of Specialization
2000 and 4.3 in 2010, that means is roughly 4 times more specialized than the
whole country. Within the production of olives, the dimension of enterprises at
Italian level increases in average of 29.75 %: it was of 0.96 hectare per enter-
prise in 2000 and it is 1.25 hectares in 2010. The province with the larger UAA
dedicated to olives (Lecce - ITF45) has an average dimension of enterprises
equal to 1.3 hectares in 2000 (64475 enterprises for 83822 hectares in 2000)
and equal to 1.5 hectares in 2010 (65738 enterprises for 97329 hectares). The
province with the bigger dimension within olives specialization in 2000 is Pavia
with 9.2 hectares per enterprise (7 enterprises for 64.4 hectares), while in 2010
is Alessandria (AL) with 3.41 hectares per enterprise (158 enterprises for 540
hectares).
The province with the lowest enterprises dimension in 2000 is Novara-ITC15
(NO) with an average dimension of 0.045 hectares per enterprise (2 enterprises
for 0.09 hectares); while in 2010 the smaller enterprises are in Fermo - IT109
(FM) with 0.4 hectares per enterprise (4520 enterprises for 1655.86 hectares).
The province with the biggest growth is Belluno - ITD33 (BL) with 0.05 hectares
per enterprise in 2000 (1 enterprise for 0.05 hectares) and 1.4 hectares per en-
terprise in 2010 (17 enterprises for 23.45 hectares). Imperia - ITC31 (IM) is
the province with the highest location quotient, in 2000 it is equal to 5.8 and
in 2010 to 5.2: that means that it was roughly 6 times more specialized than
the whole country in 2000 and 5.2 times in 2010.
In figure 7 we see that the spatial autocorrelation for 2000 is always positive
when considering different orders of contiguous neighbours. While the spatial
autocorrelation with the first order neighbor is equal to roughly 0.5, the autocor-
relation with the second order is 0.2. The autocorrelation with the sixth order
neighbor is equal to 0.2. For all the neighbour orders considered the Moran’s
I statistic is significant. In 2010 we have a very similar situation. Looking at
the distance bands, in 2000 we see that the spatial autocorrelation is significant
when considering neighbours within 50 km, both in 2000 and 2010. Then, in
global terms, the spatial autocorrelation for the specialization in olives do not
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Fig. 6: Olives Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the right
show differences between 2000 and 2010.
In figure 8 we show the Moran scatter-plot with the most influential observa-
tions. In 2000, the global Moran (considering th e first order contiguity matrix)
is equal to 0.46. There are 9 influential observations, 8 observation with a high-
high spatial relation with neighbors: Brindisi (BR), Catanzaro (CZ), Genova
(GE), Imperia (IM), Crotnone (KR), Lecce (LE), Vibo Valentia (VV), Reggio
di Calabria (RC). On the contrary, Cuneo (CN) is characterized by a low-high
relation, being a contiguity neighbour Imperia (IM). In 2010 there are some
differences in the spatial relation among neighbours: Genova (GE) is no more
influential on the global Moran’s I statistic, L’Aquila (AQ) is characterized by a
low-high spatial relation, Salerno (SA) by a low-low relation. All the other influ-
ential provinces on the south maintain a high-high relation. This indicates that
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Fig. 7: Olives Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
while in the south of Italy the production of olives is spread in all the territory,
in the center and north of the country only some provinces are larger producer
of olives representing an exception compared to their neighbours.
In figure 9, the Local Moran’s I shows the presence of two spatial regimes in
the north and in the south of the country. A cluster of specialized provinces in
the south and a cluster of no specialized provinces in the north of the country.
2.3 Grapes
In figure 10 is represented the specialization map for grapes. Hectares dedicated
to Grapes are 717334 in 2000 and 664296 in 2010. UAA used for Grapes has
increased of 52.24 % in Brescia - ITC47 (BS) (from 3968.5 hectares in 2000 to
6042 hectares in 2010) and reduced of 67 % in Messina - ITG13 (ME) (from
2688 hectares in 2000 to 893 hectares in 2010). The province with the large
UAA used for Grapes is Trapani - ITG11 (TP) with 59507 hectares of grapes
in 2000 and 62017 hectares in 2010, with a specialization index of 5.6 in 2000
and 6.1 in 2010, meaning that it is roughly 6 times more specialized in grapes
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Fig. 8: Olives Specialization and Moran I
than the whole country. In 2000, the most specialized province in grapes is
Trieste - ITD44 (TS), with a location index equal to 5.63 (190 hectares with
total UAA equal to 345 hectares). Within the production of grapes, dimension
of enterprises at Italian level increases in average of 1.9 times between 2000 and
2010 (0.91 hectares per enterprises in 2000 and 1.7 hectares per enterprises in
2010). The province with the larger UAA dedicated to Grapes (Trapani-ITG11)
has an average dimension of enterprises equal to 2.8 hectares in 2000 (21358
enterprises for 59507 hectares) and of 3.8 hectares in 2010 (16298 enterprises
for 62017 hectares). The province with the bigger dimension within grapes
specialization is Gorizia (GO) both in 2000 than in 2010 with 3.5 hectares per
enterprises in 2000 (1004 enterprises for 3498 hectares) and 5.3 hectares per
enterprise in 2010 (772 enterprises for 4070 hectares). The province with the
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Fig. 9: Olives Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the left; 2010 on
the right
lowest enterprises dimension in 2000 is Belluno - ITD33 with 0.07 hectare per
enterprise (1072 enterprises for 78.66 hectares) and 0.24 hectares per enterprise
(160 enterprises for 38.32 hectares). In 2010 it is Verbano-Cusio-Ossola - ITC14
(VB) with 0.24 hectares per enterprise (160 enterprises for 38.32 hectares). The
province with the biggest increase in the dimension of enterprises between 2000
and 2010 is Belluno - ITD33 with an increase of 6.6 times between 2000 and
2010. In 2010 the dimension of enterprises in average is of 0.48 hectare with
117 enterprises for 56.64 hectares).
In figure 11 we show two kinds of correlograms for grapes production in 2000
and 2010. Both in 2000 and 2010, only the Moran’s I measure, considering the
first contiguity neighbours, is positive and significant. Among 2000 and 2010
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Fig. 10: Grapes Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the right
the global spatial autocorrelation reduces very little from 0.2 to 0.19. Coher-
ently, the Moran’s I is significant among neighbors within a distance of 0 - 10
km.
In figure 12 Moran’s I scatter-plot for grapes production. In 2000 the global
Moran’s I statistic is equal to 0.2. There are 10 influential observations: a
high-high spatial relation hugely characterize Trieste (TS). A high-high relation
is noticeable also for Gorizia (GO) that has contiguity neighbours more spe-
cialized. Trapani (TP) has roughly the same level of specialization compared
to Trieste and it have a high-high relation with neighbours, even if they have
a lower specialization. Also Agrigento (AG), Bolzano (BZ), Trento (TN) and
Sondrio (SO) have a high-high spatial relation. Instead, Belluno (BL) has a
low specialization in grapes but it is surrounded by high specialized provinces,
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Fig. 11: Grapes Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
then it has a low-high spatial relation. Finally, Aosta (AO) and Asti (AT) are
characterized by a high-low relation with their neighbors, since they have a
high specialization in grapes but their neighbours have not. In 2010 the global
Moran’s I is roughly equal to 2000. Compared to 2000 the observation referred
to Olbia-Tempio (OT) is influential and characterized by the high-high spatial
relation, while Asti (AT) does not more result influential.
As evident with figure 13, there are two clusters of high specialized provinces
in the country. One cluster is composed by the two provinces of Trentino Alto
Adige (Bolzano - BZ and Trento - TN), the other includes two Sicilian provinces
(Trapani - TR and Agrigento - AG).
2.4 Citrus Fruit
In figure 14 we show specialization in citrus fruit production. Italy dedicates
132566.4 hectares in 2000 and 128921.1 hectares in 2010 to the production of
Citrus Fruit.
UAA used for Citrus Fruit has increased of 110 times in Firenze-ITE14 (FI)
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Fig. 12: Grapes Specialization and Moran I
(from 0.15 hectares in 2000 to 16.46 hectares in 2010) and a specular reduction
of 109.4 time in L’Aquila - ITF11 (AQ) (from 5.47 hectares in 2000 to 0.05
hectares in 2010). The province with the larger amount of UAA used for Citrus
Fruit is Catania - ITG17 (CT) with 28784 hectares in 2000 and 30255 hectares
in 2010. Within the production of citrus fruit, dimension of enterprises at
Italian level increases in average of 1.9 times between 2000 and 2010 (0.86
hectares per enterprises in 2000 and 1.6 hectares per enterprises in 2010). The
province with the larger UAA dedicated to citrus fruit (Catania - ITG17) has
an average dimension of enterprise equal to 1.54 hectares per enterprise in 2000
(18618 enterprises for 28784 hectares) and 2.6 hectares per enterprise in 2010
(11596 enterprises for 30255 hectares). It has a location quotient equal to
15.1 in 2000 and 14.4 in 2010. The province with the higher specialization
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Fig. 13: Grapes Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the left; 2010 on
the right
in Citrus fruit is Siracusa - ITG19 (SR) with a specialization index equal to
18.1 in 2000 (19403 hectares on 59209 as total) and 18.2 in 2010 (21242 on
61114 in total). The province with the bigger dimension within citrus fruit
specialization is Taranto - ITF43 (TA) in 2000 with 2.1 hectares per enterprise
(3230 enterprises for 6777 hectares) and Sondrio - ITC44 (SO) in 2010 with 5.5
hectares per enterprise (3 enterprises for 16.54 hectares). The province with the
lowest enterprises dimension in 2000 is Como - ITC42 with 0.01 hectares per
enterprise (1 enterprise for 0.01 hectares), while in 2010 is L’Aquila - ITF11 with
0.05 hectares per enterprise (1 enterprise for 0.05 hectares). The province with
the larger increase of dimension is Como- ITC42 (CO) with an increase of 17.5
times, since in 2010 the average dimension is of 0.175 hectares (1 enterprise for
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0.175 hectares).
Figure 15 shows the spatial correlogram for citrus fruit in 2000 and 2010. Both
Fig. 14: Citrus Fruits Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the right
in 2000 and 2010 the first three orders of contiguity neighbours are significantly
autocorrelated. In 2000 the Moran’s I considering the first order of contiguous
neighbours is equal to 0.57 considering two orders it is equal to 0.25 and with
the third order it is equal to 0.13. In 2010 with the first order the Moran’s I is
equal to 0.52, with the second it is 0.24 and with the third it is equal to 0.12.
Then, there is a little decrease in the spatial autocorrelation. Looking at the
distance, there is a significant spatial autocorrelation within 40 km.
Figure 16 shows the Moran’s I scatter-plot for Citrus fruit production. The
global Moran’s I is equal to 0.57 in 2000.
It is evident that the most influential units are located in the south of Calabria
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Fig. 15: Citrus Fruit Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
region with Crotone (KR), Vibo Valentia (VV), Reggio di Calabria (RC) and in
east Sicily with Messina (ME), Catania (CT), Enna (EN), Siracusa (SR) and
Ragusa (RG) with a high-high spatial relation. On Instead, Caltanisseta (CL),
is characterized by a low specialization compared to its contiguous neighbours
and then have a low-high spatial relation. In 2010 the global Moran’s I slowly
reduces to a value of 0.52. Influential observations are the same plus Catanzaro
(CZ) characterized by a high specialization and surrounded by high specialized
provinces. In practice the spatial relations remain the same.
In figure 17 we observe the cluster of high specialized provinces including
provinces of Calabria and Sicilia regions. In 2010, the number of provinces part
of the cluster increases.
2.5 Fruits
In figure 18, we show specialization in the production of fruits. For Fruits we
have 498406 hectares in 2000 and 424303.8 hectares in 2010. UAA used for
Fruits has increased of 559 times in Lodi - ITC49 (LO) (from 6.02 hectares
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Fig. 16: Citrus Fruits Specialization and Moran I
in 2000 to 3370.05 hectares in 2010) and reduced 6.1 times in Verbano-Cusio-
Ossola - ITC14 (VB) (from 230 hectares in 2000 to 37.73 hectares in 2010).
The province with the larger amount of UAA used on Fruits is Cuneo - ITC16
(CN) with 31739 hectares of fruit in 2000 and 33021 hectares in 2010. It has
a location quotient equal to 3.4 in 2000 and 4 in 2010. The most specialized
province in fruits is Bolzano - ITD10 (BZ) with a location quotient of 11.1
(18325.62 hectares on a total of 24385) in 2000, while a specialization index of
11.9 in 2010 (18973 hectares on a total of 25479). Within the production of
fruits, dimension of enterprises at Italian level increases in average of 1.8 times
between 2000 and 2010 (1 hectare per enterprises in 2000 and 1.8 hectares
per enterprises in 2010). The province with the larger UAA dedicated to fruit
(Cuneo - ITC16) has an average dimension of enterprise equal to 1.8 hectares
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Fig. 17: Citrus Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the left; 2010 on
the right
per enterprise in 2000 (17578 enterprises for 31739 hectares) and 2.8 hectares
per enterprise in 2010 (11870 enterprises for 33021 hectares). The province
with the bigger enterprise dimension within fruit specialization is Cremona -
ITC4A (CR) in 2000 with 5.4 hectares per enterprise (46 enterprises for 248
hectares) and Ferrara - ITD56 (FE) in 2010 with 6.3 hectares per enterprise
(2231 enterprises for 14017 hectares). The province with the lowest enterprises
dimension in 2000 is Belluno - ITD33 (BL) with 0.12 hectares per enterprise
(934 enterprises for 117 hectares), while in 2010 is Trieste - ITD44 (TS) with
0.18 hectares per enterprise (51 enterprises for 9 hectares). The province with
the large increase in the average dimension of enterprise for fruit is Belluno -
ITD33 with an increase of 11.5 times, with the dimension in 2010 of 1.4 hectares
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per enterprise (133 enterprises for 191 hectares).
In figure 19 the correlogram for higher spatial lag order is shown considering
Fig. 18: Fruits Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the right
the specialization of provinces in the production of fruits. In 2000 Moran’s I is
significant only when considering the first contiguity neighbour, and the value is
of 0.23. In 2010 the spatial autocorrelation increases with a value of 0.27, and
as in 2000 only the first order of contiguity neighbors are significantly spatial
autocorrelated. This is coherent when considering distances. In fact, only on
the first band we have a significant autocorrelation.
In figure 20 the Moran’s I scatter-plot referred to the production of fruits is
shown. In 2000 the global Moran’s I statistic is equal to 0.23. Bolzano (BZ)
is highly specialized and surrounded by high specialized provinces. The same
is for Trento (TN), Sondrio (SO), Napoli (NA) and Salerno (SA). Aosta (AO),
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Fig. 19: Fruit Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
Verbano-Cusio-Ossola (VB) and Massa Carrara (MS) are highly specialized but
surrounded by low specialized provinces. Finally, La Spezia (SP), Imperia (IM),
Brescia (BS), Belluno (BL) and Benevento (BN) have a low specialization with
specialized contiguous neighbours. In 2010, the global spatial autocorrelation
increases to 0.27, and it is evident also with an increase of specialization of those
provinces surrounded by high specialized provinces: La Spezia (SP), Benevento
(BN) and Caserta (CE) raise their specialization in fruit production.
In figure 21 it is shown the Local Moran’s I for fruits. In 2000, it is evident
a cluster among the provinces by Trentino Alto Adige and Sondrio (SO), with
also two high specialized clusters in Ravenna - RA and in Napoli - NA. The
latter increases its territorial dimension in 2010.
2.6 Vegetables in Open Fields
In figure 22 we show the specialization in the vegetables in open fields. To
Open field vegetable all the provinces dedicate 236823.7 hectares in 2000 and
266737.3 hectares in 2010. UAA used for Open Veg increased of 2.26 times in
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Fig. 20: Fruits Specialization and Moran I
Enna - ITG16 (EN) (from 4750 hectares in 2000 to 5160 hectares in 2010) and
was reduced of 9 times in Sondrio - ITC44 (SO) (from 140.6 hectares in 2000 to
15.6 hectares in 2010). The province with the larger amount of UAA used for
open field vegetables is Foggia - ITF41 (FO) with 20860 hectares in 2000 and
33232 hectares in 2010. It has a specialization index equal to 1.6 in 2000 (total
hectares equal to 401031) and 1.2 in 2010 (total hectares equal to 385735).
Within the production of vegetables in open fields, dimension of enterprises at
Italian level increases in average of 2.86 times (from 0.94 hectares per enterprise
in 2000 to 2.7 hectares of 2010). The province with the larger UAA dedicated
to vegetables in open fields (Foggia - ITF41) has an average dimension of en-
terprise equal to 4.2 hectares per enterprise in 2000 (4930 enterprises for 20860
hectares) and 8.8 hectares per enterprise in 2010 (3791 enterprises for 33232
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Fig. 21: Fruits Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the left; 2010 on
the right
hectares). The province with the bigger enterprise dimension within vegetables
in open fields specialization in 2000 and 2010 is Piacenza - ITD51 (PC) with
14.1 hectares per enterprise in 2000 (1135 enterprises for 16044 hectares) and
19.15 hectares per enterprise in 2010 (804 enterprises for 15399 hectares). Pia-
cenza is also the most specialized in this production, with a specialization index
of 7.6 in 2000 (a total of 65646 hectares). In 2010 L’Aquila - ITF11 (AQ)
becomes the most specialized province, with a specialization index of 7.3 (7747
hectares on a total of 26781). The province with the lowest enterprises dimen-
sion in 2000 is Frosinone - ITE45 (FR) with 0.11 hectares per enterprise (4698
enterprises for 562.3 hectares), while in 2010 is Genova - ITC33 (GE) with 0.2
hectares per enterprise (903 enterprises for 195 hectares). The province with
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the large increase in the average dimension of enterprise for vegetables in open
fields is Potenza - ITF51 (PZ) with an increase of 5.4 times: 0.5 hectares per
enterprise in 2000 (6350 enterprises for 3183 hectares) and 2.7 in 2010 (1294
enterprises for 3541 hectares).
Figure 23 shows the spatial correlogram for open field vegetables. Spatial
Fig. 22: Veg in open field Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the right
autocorrelation is significant in 2000 only when considering the eighth order of
contiguity neighbors. On the countrary, in 2010 there is not a significant spatial
autocorrelation. Looking at the distance, there is a significant spatial autocor-
relation when considering neighbors within 100-110 km in both 2000 and 2010.
In figure 24 the Moran’s I scatterplot and the influential provinces are shown.
The global Moran’s I is equal to 0.11. Piacenza (PC) is the most special-
ized province, surrounded by specialized neighbors: Parma (PR), Genova (GE),
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Fig. 23: Open Veg Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
La Spezia (SP). Notwithstanding it is high specialized and in contiguity with
Genova, Savona (SV) is in average surrounded by low specialized neighbours.
L’aquila (AQ) has a high specialization but it is surrounded by low specialized
provinces, including Frosinone (FR), which has Latina (LT) as contiguous neigh-
bour with high specialization surrounded by other specialized provinces. Finally,
Napoli (NA) is highly specialized as its neighbours in open field vegetables. In
2010 the global Moran’s I increases to 0.12, and Roma (RO) increases its index
of specialization being more specialized compared to the rest of the country,
with high specialized neighbors.
In figure 25 are shown the hotspots and clusters referred to the specialization
in the cultivation of vegetables in open field. A consolidated cluster of high
specialized provinces is present between the provinces of Genova (GE), Parma
(PA), Piacenza (PC) and La Spezia (SP) in the north of Italy. In the south a
cluster of high specialized provinces includes Caserta (CE), Napoli (NA), Salerno
(SA) in 2000, while in 2010 this cluster shifts towards north including Roma
(RM) and Latina (LT) and loosing Salerno (SA). Moreover, in 2010 in Sardinia
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Fig. 24: Veg in open field Specialization and Moran I
there is a specialized cluster by Oristano (OR) and Medio Campidano (VS).
2.7 Greenhouse Vegetables
In figure 26 we show Italian provinces specialized in greenhouse vegetables. To
the greenhouse vegetables, 22472 hectares in 2000 and 32944 hectars in 2010
are dedicated. UAA used for Close Veg increased of 548 times in Aosta - ITC20
(AO) (from 0.09 hectares in 2000 to 49.3 hectares in 2010) and reduced of
12.8 times in Pordenone - ITD41 (PN) (from 155.49 hectares in 2000 to 12.12
hectares in 2010). The province with the larger amount of UAA used for Green-
house Vegetables is Ragusa - ITG18 (RG) with 4459 hectares in 2000 and 5701
hectares in 2010. It is also the most specialized one in 2000 with a location quo-
tient of 30.4 (47895.53 total hectares) and 27.2 in 2010 (43031 total hectares).
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Fig. 25: Veg in open field Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the
left; 2010 on the right
Within the production of greenhouse vegetables, dimension of enterprises at
Italian level increases in average of 1.7 times, from 0.9 hectares per enter-
prise in 2000 to 1.5 in 2010. The province with the larger UAA dedicated
to greenhouse vegetables (Ragusa - ITG18) has an average dimension of en-
terprise equal to 1.15 hectares in 2000 (3871 enterprises for 4459 hectares)
and of 1.7 in 2010 (3331 enterprises for 5701 hectares). The province with
the bigger enterprise dimension within greenhouse vegetables specialization in
2000 is Lodi - ITC49 (LO) with 12.9 hectares per enterprise (6 enterprises for
77.6 hectares). The province with the lowest average enterprise dimension in
2000 is Aosta - ITC20 (AO) with 0.045 hectares for enterprise (2 enterprises
for 0.09 hectares). In 2010, the province with the bigger enterprise dimension
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is Mantova- ITC4B (MN) with 9.4 hectares for enterprise (284 enterprises for
2670.11 hectares), while the province with the smaller dimension is Verbano-
Cusio-Ossola - ITC14 (VB) with 0.03 hectares for enterprise (7 enterprises for
9.6 hectars). The province with the large increase in the average dimension of
enterprise for greenhouse vegetables is Avellino - ITF34 (AV) with an increase
of 7.5 times, from 0.1 hectares per enterprise (208 enterprises for 19.5 hectares)
in 2000 to 0.7 hectares per enterprise (49 enterprises for 35 hectares).
The spatial correlogram for provinces specialized in greenhouse vegetables is
Fig. 26: Greenhouse Veg Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the right
shown in figure 27. In 2000 there is no significant autocorrelation whatever
order of contiguity we consider. In 2010, instead, there is significant spatial
autocorrelation among the first order of contiguous neighbours equal to 0.15.
In terms of distance, there is significant spatial autocorrelation within a distance
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band of 40-50 km in 2000, while in 2010 there is significance within a distance
of 0-10 km and 40-50 km.
Figure 28 shows the Moran’s I scatter-plot. The Moran’s I statistic in 2000
Fig. 27: Greenhouse Veg Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
is equal to 0.10. The most specialized province is Ragusa (RG), surrounded in
average by specialized provinces. A high - high spatial relation characterized
also Siracusa (SR) and Caltanissetta (CL), both contiguous of Ragusa, while
Catania (CT) is not specialized more than the average. Moreover, Salerno (SA)
and Latina (LT) are highly specialized and surrounded in average by specialized
provinces. In 2010, the global Moran’s I increases to 0.15. Frosinone (FR)
becomes influential, and it is surrounded more than before by highly specialized
provinces, but it still has not specialization in greenhouse vegetables.
In figure 29 it is presented the Local Moran’s I for the specialization in
greenhouse vegetables. In 2000 a cluster is present in all the country, represented
by two Sicilian provinces: Ragusa (RG) and Siracusa (SR). In 2010 this cluster
develops including Caltanissetta (CL). Moreover, in 2010 another cluster of high
specialized provinces is composed by Caserta (CE), Salerno (SA), Napoli (NA),
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Fig. 28: Greenhouse Veg Specialization and Moran I
Latina (LT).
2.8 Industrial Crops
In figure 30 we show the specialization map for industrial crops. 510992 hectares
in 2000 and 342794 hectares in 2010 are dedicated to industrial crops. UAA
used for Industrial Crops increased of 292 times in Olbia-Tempio - ITG29 (OT)
(from 0.17 hectares in 2000 to 49.62 hectares in 2010) and reduced of 183.8
times in Oristano - ITG28 (OR) (from 3641.3 hectares in 2000 to 19.8 hectares
in 2010). The province with the larger amount of UAA used for Industrial
crops in 2000 is Perugia - ITE21 (PG) with 34664 hectares, while in 2010 the
‘leader’ in those crops is Venezia - ITD35 (VE) with 26696 hectares. It is the
most specialized province with a location quotient equal to 3.9 in 2000 (total
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Fig. 29: Greenhouse Veg Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the left;
2010 on the right
hectares equal to 94438). In 2010, instead, Pordenone - ITD41 (PN) is the
most specialized province in industrial crops with an index of 5.5 (with 14655
hectares use for industrial crops up to a total amount of 51897). Within the
production of Industrial crops, dimension of enterprises at Italian level increases
in average of 1.1 times: from 5.3 hectares per enterprise in 2000 to 5.9 hectares
per enterprise in 2010. The province with the larger UAA dedicated to industrial
crops in 2000 (Perugia - ITE21) has an average dimension of enterprise equal
to 6.4 hectars per enterprise (5453 enterprises for 34664 hectares), while the
“leader” in 2010 (Venezia - ITD35) has an average dimension of 5.2 hectares
per enterprise (5149 enterprises for 26696 hectares). The province with the big-
ger enterprise dimension within industrial crop in 2000 is Barletta-Andria-Trani
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- IT110 (BT) with 15.7 hectares per enterprise (40 enterprises for 626 hectares)
and the province with the smaller dimension is Verbano-Cusio-Ossola - ITC14
(VB) with 0.01 hectares per enterprise (1 enterprise). In 2010 the province with
the largest enterprises is Matera - ITF52 (MT) with 19 hectares per enterprise
(13 enterprises for 248 hectares), while the smallest is Trapani - ITG11 (TP)
with 0.2 hectares per enterprise (329 enterprises for 72 hectares). The province
with the largest growth in the dimension of enterprises is Olbia-Tempio - ITG29
with an average dimension of 0.03 hectares per enterprise (6 enterprises for 0.17
hectares), while in 2010 the average dimension is of 2.8 hectars per enterprise
(18 enterprises for 49.6 hectares).
Figure 31 shows the spatial correlogram for industrial crops for 2000 and 2010.
Fig. 30: Industrial Crops Specialization: 2000 on the left; 2010 on the righ
In 2000 there is significant spatial autocorrelation among the first three order
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of contiguous neighbours. While the Moran’s I statistic is equal to 0.55 among
first order contiguous neighbour, it is equal to 0.32 among the second order
and to 0.15 among the third. In 2010 the first two order of contiguous neigh-
bours are significantly spatially autocorrelated, with the Moran’s I equal to 0.62
among the first order and to 0.33 among the second order. There is big raise
in the spatial autocorrelation among 2000 and 2010. Looking at the distance,
the spatial autocorrelation is significant among the bands that go form 0-10
to 30-40 km, and then to 130-140 km. In 2010, instead, there is a significant
spatial autocorrelation within distance bands that go from 0-10 to 30-40 km.
Figure 32 shows the Moran’s I scatter-plot for 2000 and 2010 and the most
Fig. 31: Industrial Crops Spatial Correlograms and Moran I
influential observations. The global Moran’s I in 2000 is equal to 0.53. It is
evident the presence of two clusters of provinces. One includes Perugia (PR),
Arezzo (AR) and Terni (TR) in center Italy. The other cluster includes Venezia
(VE) that is the most specialized, Padova (PD), Pordenone (PN), Udine (UD),
Gorizia (GO). Even if surrounded by high specialized provinces, Trieste (TS) is
not itself specialized in industrial crops. In 2010 the global Moran’s I statis-
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tic increases to 0.61. The most specialized province is now Pordenone (PN).
The central cluster includes shifts to east, since Terni (TR) and Arezzo (AR)
reduce their specialization, while Ancona (AN) and Fermo (FM) increase their
specialization in industrial crops.
Fig. 32: Industrial Crops Specialization and Moran I
In figure 33 it is shown the Local Moran’s I statistic for 2000 and 2010 in
Industrial crops. Two clusters of high specialized provinces are stable during
the time, and both reduce their territorial dimension among 2000 and 2010.
The first cluster includes several provinces of central Italy, and it experiences
a territorial reduction between the 2000 and 2010. The same happens for the
cluster in the northeast of Italy.
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Fig. 33: Industrial Crops Specialization hotspots and clusters: 2000 on the left;
2010 on the right
3 Specialization and Productivity
Considering the term of ‘cluster’ as something vague, Iammarino and McCann
(2006) propose a ‘knowledge-based taxonomy of clusters’ that is ‘independent
of either the sector or the location, but instead is based on the microeco-
nomic behavior and objectives of the clustered firms, and on the relations and
transactions existing in the cluster’. From an ‘evolutionary’ standpoint, they
propose four ideal types of clusters: firstly, ‘pure agglomeration’ with Jacobs
externalities, related to the ideas shown in the literature by the new economic
geography on agglomeration and dispersal forces acting at local and regional
levels. This cluster is characterized by a codified, explicit and mobile technical
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knowledge. The examples of industrial specialization are represented by finance,
banking and insurance, while a cluster example is the ’Silicon Valley’ in Califor-
nia. Secondly, the ‘industrial complex’ theorized by the neo-classical theorists,
where knowledge has the characteristics to be systemic and routinized, specific
and non-transferable. Examples of industrial specialization are the automotive,
chemicals, pharmaceutical, ICT and a cluster example would be the ’Silicon
Glen’ (Scottish Electronics Industry). Lastly, the ‘social network cluster’ based
on the literature of Regional Innovation Systems by Cooke, Gomez Uranga and
Etxebarria (1997), based on trust and social capital, that may be split in Old
and New Social Network. The New social network cluster is characterized by a
tacit, new, generic, non-systemic knowledge, that is transmitted within cogni-
tive networks. The typical industrial specialization are the high tech clusters in
general purpose technologies, composed by science-based firms. The Old social
network cluster is characterized by a mixed, mature and incremental knowl-
edge. Examples of industrial specialization are the customized traditional goods
textiles, tourism, furniture. The “classic” Italian industrial district would be
an example of old social network, with the characteristic of being composed by
supplier dominated firms. Lindgaard Christensen et al. (2011) demonstrate that
the agricultural sector is characterized by an extended knowledge base, repre-
senting a source of information and knowledge useful for innovation processes.
This may explain why traditional survey do not capture the external sources of
innovation in agriculture.
Avermaete et al. (2003) underline how in the small Belgian food firms, innova-
tion is quite different from high technology industries. In fact, in the agricultural
sector, innovation is related to the introduction of something new that already
exists by firms, rather than innovation in the sense of invention. In such a
cluster, specialization influences an exchange of ideas and innovation, thus rais-
ing the productivity. Within clusters of small farmers, factors driving economic
growth are essentially related to the network of relationships, the norm of open
share of information, trust among members of the community, a shared com-
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mitment towards the cluster, as underlined by Brasier et al. (2007), studying
several small farmers communities in Northeast United States. The same is
found by Glowacki-Dudka, Murray and Isaacs (2013), when make a qualitative
study on the local food system in the Midwest in the United States. In fact, it
is the “coalitions and partnerships with each other, with other businesses, with
government entities, and with the consumers” that allows the entire community
to develop economically. As stated by Lyson (2004), the “most fundamental
needs of the local agricultural community is its ability to solve problems coop-
eratively”. It is evident that clusters in the agricultural sector are characterized
by tacit knowledge exchanges where trust and social capital are key channels
for triggering the innovation process. Then, the agricultural clusters have the
typical characteristics of an old social network typology of cluster as defined by
Iammarino and McCann (2006). A vast literature exists on the relation between
clusters and innovation processes and earlier studies bind the two concepts. If a
cluster is defined as the “agglomeration of specialized actors that compete and
cooperate” by Porter (2000), the process of innovation is seen by Coe and Bun-
nell (2003) as “a system enacted through actors in networks of social relations”.
In literature agglomeration is considered an enhancer for innovation and pro-
ductivity. In this context, Storper and Venables (2004) underline that “face to
face is important in environments where information is imperfect, rapidly chang-
ing and not easily codified, key features of many creative activities”. Different
kinds of proximity, not just in terms of geographical distance, are involved in
interactive learning and innovation processes. Boschma (2005) claims that geo-
graphical proximity is “neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for learning
to take place”. “It facilitates interactive learning by strengthening the other
dimensions of proximity” (cognitive, organizational, social, institutional). As
Boschma (2005) underlines, “proximity may also have negative impacts on in-
novation” due to the problem of lock-in.
Furthermore, the most important linkages enhancing innovation process are
those among ‘related varieties’ in the technological pattern (Iammarino and
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McCann, 2006). The dynamics of clusters are not standardized, but depen-
dent on technological regimes, industrial structures and organizational prac-
tices (Iammarino and McCann, 2006). As underlined by Malerba and Orsenigo
(1997), a relationship exists between the “observed patterns of innovative ac-
tivities within a sector and the related context and underlying microeconomic
processes that might account for them”. This analysis account for these dif-
ferent patterns within the agricultural sector, taking into account different crop
production separately. Absorptive capacity (a concept by Cohen and Levinthal,
1990) is the capacity to acquire new knowledge, and it is dependent on the
process of interactive learning. The creation of knowledge and the process of
learning has a cumulative nature. Consequently, it features an implicit risk be-
cause it is difficult to change efficiently the process, once it is started (ibid.).
As underlined by Breschi, Lissoni and Malerba (2003), only the participation
in a network gives the opportunity to access a local ‘pool of knowledge’ giving
rise to “localised knowledge spillovers”. In fact, the participation in different
networks may generate new ideas (Utterback, 1971). The extra local knowledge
flows and the local buzz (Storper and Venables, 2004) are ‘mutually reinforcing’
(Bathelt, Malmberg and Maskell, 2004). Moreover, not all the external knowl-
edge linkages have the same effect in the cluster and in each firm.
Given these features of the agricultural clusters, our analysis aims to assess
the impact of specialization on the productivity when considering separately
agricultural sub-sectors. In particular we want to check if specialization in agri-
culture may be the cause of a typical ‘lock−in’ situation and, if it is the case,
in which particular crop. We consider also an index of diversification, taking
into account the possibility that diversification in agriculture might generate
circulation of new ideas (innovation) and then it may be cause of a positive
effect on productivity. Moreover, we consider the interaction among specializa-
tion and diversification since specialization and diversification together might
guarantee the circulation of new ideas (innovation), at the same time gener-
ating a specialized knowledge on particular productions. Studying the whole
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agricultural sector in European regions, Ezcurra et al. (2011) underline that
specialization may affect productivity both negatively and positively. Special-
ization may affect productivity positively since it translates to a great effort by
agents involved, with greater investments that, in turn, affect the introduction
of technology. On the other hand, specialization in agriculture could also mean
that there is not capacity in the region to make business through other economic
sectors. Furthermore, the effect of specialization on productivity may depend
by the agricultural sub-sector. Ezcurra et al. (2011) find a positive relation
among specialization and productivity analysing the whole agricultural sector,
as a positive impact by the farm size.
Following Millo and Piras (2012), a generic spatial panel model may be
written as:
y = λ(IT ⊗WN )y +Xβ + u
Where: y is an NT×1 vector of dependent variable observations; X is an NT×k
matrix of exogenous regressors observations; IT is an identity matrix; WN is
the exogenous matrix of spatial weights and λ is the corresponding parameter.
u = (ιT ⊗ IN )µ+ ε
where: ι is a T × 1 vector of ones; IN an identity matrix; µ is a vector of
individual effects, not spatial autocorrelated and time invariant, ε is a vector of
spatial autocorrelated innovations:
ε = ρ(IT ⊗WN )ε+ v
with ρ < 1, vit ∼ IID(0, σ2v) and εit ∼ IID(0, σ2ε).
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3.1 Empirical Model
The empirical model used in the analysis is:
Proit = λ
∑
j
wijProit + β0 + β1ln(SPEit) + β2ln(DIVit)+
+β3ln(DIVit)ln(SPEit) + β4ln(DIMit) + εit (2)
εit = ρ
∑
j
wijεit + it (3)
where:
Proit is the land productivity expressed as the ratio among the number
of hectares used for producing a crop i and the total obtained production;
SPEit is an index of specialization as described in the precedent section;
DIVit is an index of diversification as described in the precedent section;
DIMit is the dimension of enterprises that is the UAA used for the culti-
vation of crop i divided by the number of enterprises cultivating the crop
i;
λ is the is the spatial autoregressive parameter for the dependent variable;
ρ is the is the spatial autoregressive parameter for the disturbance vector
εit;
it is the innovation vector correspondent to εit.
We use land productivity (production on the hectares cultivated) as proxy
for productivity in agriculture. As highlighted by Dharmasiri (2012), the use of
this proxy is criticized by several scholars since agricultural productivity should
contain other factors influencing the production process, such as “labor, farming
experiences, fertilizers, availability and management of water and other biologi-
cal factors”. Our analysis controsl for fixed effects by provinces through a spatial
panel model, in order to explain exclusively the role of relative specialization (as
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land specialization) and diversification (as land diversification) on productivity,
hypothesizing that higher specialization should contribute to higher circulation
of knowledge and, in turn, higher productivity. We use the Herfindahl concen-
tration index based on UAA as measure of crop diversification in the provinces
with two important modifications (Marrocu, Paci and Usai, 2013): we make
use of the inversed index in order to interpret the sign of the coefficient more
simply; moreover, as in Combes (2000), the sum of the squares of UAA for a
given province and a given sub-sector does not include the UAA of that sub-
sector. Then , the measure of diversity (DIV) of sector j in region i is calculated
respect to the rest of the agricultural sector (j 6= j′):
DIVij =
1∑
j′=1(Lij′/Li − Lij)2
(4)
where i relates to provinces and j to the sub-sector.
The model estimates two spatial processes: direct spatial spillovers between
levels of productivity and spillovers between idiosyncratic features of the environ-
ment affecting productivity. We are primarily interested in the former (captured
by the parameter λ), which reflects the typology of the diffusion of produc-
tivity among provinces. However, the inclusion of the latter (captured by the
parameter ρ) is justified on an economic basis, because neighboring provinces
do share idiosyncratic characteristics, and as a consequence their inclusion in
the model is necessary for a consistent estimation of the standard errors of the
other parameters (Kelejian, Murrell and Shepotylo, 2013).
The estimation is conducted following an ML implementation by Millo and Piras
(2012).
We use fixed effects and time fixed effects. This is absolutely important to avoid
omitted variable bias and to consider the seasonality in the production of crops.
As underlined by the literature discussed in the previous sections, geographical
concentration of specialized firms is consider as triggering knowledge spillovers
and innovation. In this analysis, we consider also the dimension of enterprises
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as determinant for productivity. Notwithstanding a large number of researches
have been dedicated to this relationship, there is not a consensus on the effect of
the enterprises dimension on the productivity in agriculture (Alvarez and Arias,
2004). Considering the Italian case, Galluzzo (2013) underline that small farms,
representing the 70 % of Italian agricultural sector, can take advantage accord-
ing to the indexes of technical efficiency of scale especially through a growth
in size of enterprises in the surface grown. Mugera and Langemeier (2011)
argue that in the case of Kansas, technical efficiency differ by farm size, but
not by specialization. Larger farms are more technically efficient than smaller
farms. Moreover, he suggests that inefficiency is due to poor managerial prac-
tices rather than to scale of operation. Medium size farms are more efficient
compared to large size and small size farms. Moreover, he points at the educa-
tion as a principal factor to improve efficiency. Olson and Vu (2009), by using
different methodologies for analysing Minnesota between 1993 and 2006, find
that larger farm size is the only factor explaining higher efficiency, while the
measurement of the influence by other factors, such as specialization, depends
by the used methodology. Paul and Nehring (2005) argue that the scale and
the output diversification seem to be key factors in productivity growth in U.S.
agriculture. Halloran and Archer (2008) underline that, in general, the adoption
of new technologies fosters expansion of productions to capture economies of
size and to specialize.
In Table 1 we observe the results of the spatial panel estimation of the model
we described on equation (2). Productivity of land is affected positively by its
spatial lag, with a huge effect when considering grapes, olives and open veg
production. Dimension of enterprises has a significant and positive effect on
productivity only when considering grapes and citrus fruits, while its effect on
productivity is still significant but negative when considering fruits and green-
house vegetables. Specialization has a positive effect on the productivity of
olives, grapes and industrial crops. While its effect is significant and negative
for cereals, citrus fruits and fruits. Diversification has a significant and nega-
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tive effect on cereals productivity and a positive effect on grapes productivity.
Interaction among specialization and diversification has a significant effect on
productivity of olives, grapes and open veg., while its effect is negative for fruits.
4 Conclusions
This paper is divided in two parts. The first part describes the provincial special-
ization in Italy among ten main crops groups in 2000 and 2010, using censuses
data by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). The description is enriched
by the discussion about spatial autocorrelation. The analysis makes use of
both global and local spatial autocorrelation tests to underline spatial relations
among provinces for the main crop groups, and to understand the specialization
dynamic within each crop group. In particular, we analyse specialization and
spatial relations among the 110 Italian provinces for 2000 and 2010 within the
following main crop groups: cereals, olives, grapes, citrus fruits, fruits, vegeta-
bles in open fields, greenhouse vegetables, industrial crops. The spatial analysis
makes use for each of those of visual instruments: maps describing special-
ization for 2000 and 2010; diverse types of correlograms in order to show the
spatial characteristics of crop specializations; global Moran’s I to describe the
global spatial autocorrelation; Moran’s I scatterplot to detect provinces with
unusually strong influence on the global autocorrelation; local Moran’s I to de-
tect ’clusters’ (provinces specialized similarly to their neighbors) and ’hotspots’
(provinces specialized very differently to their neighbors). Overall, it is no-
ticeable a raise of specialization and a raise of spatial autocorrelation in the
specializations, mostly in all sectors. At the same time, among 2000 and 2010,
there is an increase of territorial dimension by clusters within all the main crop
groups but the industrial crops. There is a marked tendency toward clustering
influencing the decision by producers about which typology of production to
invest on. In particular, it is in place a cluster dynamic in cereals and in the
industrial crops. This dynamic is marked among northern and central provinces.
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In the southern provinces is evident a cluster dynamic in the production of those
crops representing traditionally a ‘natural’ vocation (such as olives and citrus
fruits) of those territories. While a large amount of researches focus on the
relation among clusters and innovation/productivity within industrial sectors,
small attention has been payed to the agricultural sector. The second part of
the paper is dedicated to the discussion about the role of specialization and
diversification on productivity of land. An index of relative specialization is
built as a Location Quotient (or Balassa Index) and an index of diversification
is built as Herfindahl Index for each main crop group. The aim is to analyse,
for each main crop group, the effect of specialization and diversification on pro-
ductivity. The hypothesis is that may happen that too specialized sub-sectors
produce the lock in problem. The findings reveal that specialization does not
affect equally the land productivity for all the crop groups. It affects positively
the productivity of grapes, olives and industrial crops, while it affects negatively
the productivity of cereals, citrus fruits and fruits. This may reveal a problem
of ‘lock−in’ in those areas highly specialized in citrus fruits, cereals and fruits.
Diversification in sown crops results significant and positive for land productiv-
ity when cultivating grapes, while the effect is negative on the productivity for
cereals. Therefore, a suggested policy to be implemented in those areas is the
stimulation of a greater diversification of productions. Instead, in areas which
are prone to the production of olives and grapes, a policy to boost specialization
would be more desirable. This analysis has shown that a change in this direction
is already in place.
156
REFERENCES
References
Alvarez, Antonio and Carlos Arias. 2004. “Technical efficiency and farm size: a
conditional analysis.” Agricultural Economics 30(3):241–250.
Anselin, Luc. 1995. “Local indicators of spatial associationLISA.” Geographical
analysis 27(2):93–115.
Anselin, Luc. 2003. “Spatial externalities, spatial multipliers, and spatial econo-
metrics.” International regional science review 26(2):153–166.
Avermaete, Tessa, Jacques Viaene, Eleanor J Morgan and Nick Crawford. 2003.
“Determinants of innovation in small food firms.” European journal of inno-
vation management 6(1):8–17.
Bathelt, Harald, Anders Malmberg and Peter Maskell. 2004. “Clusters and
knowledge: local buzz, global pipelines and the process of knowledge cre-
ation.” Progress in human geography 28(1):31–56.
Beaudry, Catherine and Andrea Schiffauerova. 2009. “Who’s right, Marshall
or Jacobs? The localization versus urbanization debate.” Research Policy
38(2):318–337.
Bivand, Roger S, Edzer J Pebesma and Virgilio Go´mez-Rubio. 2008. Applied
spatial data analysis with R. Vol. 747248717 Springer.
Boschma, Ron. 2005. “Proximity and innovation: a critical assessment.” Re-
gional studies 39(1):61–74.
Brasier, Kathryn J, Stephan Goetz, Lindsay A Smith, Molly Ames, Joanna
Green, Tim Kelsey, Anu Rangarajan and Walt Whitmer. 2007. “Small farm
clusters and pathways to rural community sustainability.” Community Devel-
opment 38(3):8–22.
Brasili, Cristina and Roberto Fanfani. 2010. “The Agrifood Districts in the New
Millennium.” Proceedings in Food System Dynamics pp. 10–30.
Breschi, Stefano, Francesco Lissoni and Franco Malerba. 2003. “Knowledge-
relatedness in firm technological diversification.” Research Policy 32(1):69–
87.
Coe, Neil M and Timothy G Bunnell. 2003. “Spatializingknowledge commu-
nities: towards a conceptualization of transnational innovation networks.”
Global networks 3(4):437–456.
Cohen, Wesley M and Daniel A Levinthal. 1990. “Absorptive capacity: a
new perspective on learning and innovation.” Administrative science quar-
terly 35(1).
Cooke, Philip, Mikel Gomez Uranga and Goio Etxebarria. 1997. “Regional
innovation systems: Institutional and organisational dimensions.” Research
policy 26(4):475–491.
157
REFERENCES
Dharmasiri, Lal Mervin. 2012. “Measuring Agricultural Productivity Using the
Average Productivity Index (API).” Sri Lanka Journal of Advanced Social
Studies 1(2):25–44.
Ezcurra, Roberto, Belen Ira´izoz, Pedro Pascual and Manuel Rapu´n. 2011. “Agri-
cultural productivity in the European regions Trends and explanatory factors.”
European Urban and Regional Studies 18(2):113–135.
Friedmann, Harriet. 1993. “The political economy of food: a global crisis.”
New left review pp. 29–29.
Fujita, Masahisa. 1988. “A monopolistic competition model of spatial agglom-
eration: Differentiated product approach.” Regional Science and Urban Eco-
nomics 18(1):87–124.
Galluzzo, Nicola. 2013. “Farm Dimension and Efficiency in Italian Agriculture:
A Quantitative Approach.” American Journal of Rural Development 1(2):26–
32.
Glaeser, Edward L, Hedi D Kallal, Jose A Scheinkman and Andrei Shleifer. 1991.
Growth in cities. Technical report National Bureau of Economic Research.
Glowacki-Dudka, Michelle, Jennifer Murray and Karen P Isaacs. 2013. “Ex-
amining social capital within a local food system.” Community Development
Journal 48(1):75–88.
Haining, Robert P. 2003. Spatial data analysis: theory and practice. Cambridge
University Press.
Halloran, JM and DW Archer. 2008. “External economic drivers and US
agricultural production systems.” Renewable Agriculture and Food Systems
23(04):296–303.
Hidalgo, Ce´sar A, Bailey Klinger, A-L Baraba´si and Ricardo Hausmann.
2007. “The product space conditions the development of nations.” Science
317(5837):482–487.
Iammarino, Simona and Philip McCann. 2006. “The structure and evolution
of industrial clusters: Transactions, technology and knowledge spillovers.”
Research policy 35(7):1018–1036.
Kelejian, Harry H., Peter Murrell and Oleksandr Shepotylo. 2013. “Spatial
spillovers in the development of institutions.” Journal of Development Eco-
nomics 101:297–315.
Krugman, Paul. 1990. Increasing returns and economic geography. Technical
report National Bureau of Economic Research.
Krugman, Paul R. 1991. Geography and trade. MIT press.
Lindgaard Christensen, Jesper, Michael Dahl, Søren Eliasen, Rene´ Nielsen and
Christian Richter Østergaard. 2011. “Patterns and collaborators of innovation
in the primary sector: a study of the Danish agriculture, forestry and fishery
industry.” Industry and Innovation 18(02):203–225.
158
REFERENCES
Lyson, Thomas A. 2004. Civic agriculture: Reconnecting farm, food, and com-
munity. UPNE.
Malerba, Franco and Luigi Orsenigo. 1993. “Technological regimes and firm
bebavior.” Industrial and corporate change 2(1):45–71.
Malerba, Franco and Luigi Orsenigo. 1997. “Technological regimes and sectoral
patterns of innovative activities.” Industrial and corporate change 6(1):83–
118.
Marrocu, Emanuela, Raffaele Paci and Stefano Usai. 2013. “Productivity growth
in the Old and New Europe: the role of agglomeration externalities.” Journal
of Regional Science 53(3):418–442.
Marshall, Alfred, Alfred Marshall, Alfred Marshall and Alfred Marshall. 1920.
“Principles of economics: an introductory volume.”.
McMichael, Philip. 2005. Global development and the corporate food regime.
Vol. 11 Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
Millo, Giovanni and Gianfranco Piras. 2012. “splm: Spatial panel data models
in R.” Journal of Statistical Software 47(1):1–38.
Mugera, Amin W and Michael R Langemeier. 2011. “Does farm size and spe-
cialization matter for productive efficiency? Results from Kansas.” Journal
of Agricultural and Applied Economics 43(4):515.
Olson, Kent and Linh Vu. 2009. “Economic efficiency in farm households:
trends, explanatory factors, and estimation methods.” Agricultural economics
40(5):587–599.
Paul, Catherine J Morrison and Richard Nehring. 2005. “Product diversifi-
cation, production systems, and economic performance in US agricultural
production.” Journal of Econometrics 126(2):525–548.
Porter, Michael E. 2000. “Location, competition, and economic develop-
ment: Local clusters in a global economy.” Economic development quarterly
14(1):15–34.
Rosenthal, Stuart S and William C Strange. 2004. “Evidence on the nature
and sources of agglomeration economies.” Handbook of regional and urban
economics 4:2119–2171.
Saxenian, AnnaLee. 1996. Regional advantage: Culture and competition in
Silicon Valley and Route 128. Harvard University Press.
Storper, Michael and Anthony J Venables. 2004. “Buzz: face-to-face contact
and the urban economy.” Journal of economic geography 4(4):351–370.
Tukey, John W. 1977. “Exploratory data analysis.”.
Utterback, James M. 1971. “The process of technological innovation within the
firm.” Academy of management Journal 14(1):75–88.
159
REFERENCES
Venables, Anthony J. 1996. “Equilibrium locations of vertically linked indus-
tries.” International Economic Review pp. 341–359.
Waller, Lance A and Carol A Gotway. 2004. Applied spatial statistics for public
health data. Vol. 368 John Wiley & Sons.
Ward, Neil and Reidar Alma˚s. 1997. “Explaining change in the international
agro-food system.” Review of International PoIiticaI Economy 4(4):611–629.
160
Conclusions
This work collects three distinct contributions which find a common frame-
work in local economic development theory. The research makes use of quanti-
tative methodologies, to analyse issues related to regional development with a
focus on European and Italian regions.
The first contribution finds a main object in the assessment of the influence
that administrative continuity exerts on the efficiency by regional governments
in Italy. Particular attention has been payed to regional differences in the en-
dowment of social capital, which the model controlled for. Indeed, the effect
by administrative continuity on administrative efficiency is conditioned by the
quality and the level of social capital in the region. In detail, the analysis distin-
guishes three typologies of social capital: bridging, bonding and linking social
capital, and it makes a distinction between long−term and short−term policies
efficiency.
The results of the analysis support the hypothesis stating that administrative
continuity affects positively efficiency in both long term and short term policies.
This findings confirm that AC plays a positive role in regional governments.
In fact, it allows regional administrations to have time for assuming weighted
decisions aiming at long term objectives, without the contingent strain for the
satisfaction of just immediate needs. When analysing short-term policies and
controlling for bridging, bonding, and linking SC, administrative continuity has
been found to have a negative effect on administrative efficiency. In other words,
when considering policies whose effect is expected to be produced in the short
term, administrative dis-continuity in local governments has a positive outcome.
This may be due to the need by regional governments to provide the community
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with immediate results.
The research also assessed the role and the effect by administrative continu-
ity on the regional government efficiency when interacting with different levels
and components of SC. Although AC represents a positive element for regional
governments, the analysis showed it has a diversified impact on regions with
different levels of bridging, bonding and linking SC.
Indeed, when considering long-term policies, the interaction among adminis-
trative continuity and bridging SC produces a strong positive effect on the
efficiency of regional administrations. A positive effect on efficiency by the in-
teraction among administrative continuity and linking SC has been also found.
Diversely, the interaction among administrative continuity and bonding SC pro-
duces a negative effect on the level of efficiency. In fact in this case, AC is
likely to encourage inefficiency probably because it results in political patronage.
These findings opposes Olson’s standpoint (Olson (2008)), whereby administra-
tive continuity is coupled with corruption in every situation and in all contexts.
This work showed that the relationship between administrative continuity and
administrative efficiency depends on the quality of the SC existing in a region.
The study of policies and regional governance has been at the heart of the
European debate for improving regional policies in recent years. The European
Commission, in several occasions, has highlighted the institution building as a
key issue when defining strategies for bettering the economic and social life of
EU citizens (Barca (2009); Investing in Europe?s future. Fifth report on eco-
nomic, social and territorial cohesion. Foreword, summary, conclusions, maps
and comments (2010)). In particular, the European Commission prompted the
regional institutions to foster innovation in governance and policy making, by
developing, defining, and ultimately realising a strategy for sustainable economic
and social development (Investing in Europe?s future. Fifth report on economic,
social and territorial cohesion. Foreword, summary, conclusions, maps and com-
ments (2010)).
The present work is intended to contribute to the understanding those cases in
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which administrative continuity might represent a political driver for the imple-
mentation of efficient policies. It is also intended to warn against the considering
of government continuity as a positive element in every context, providing con-
crete and useful evidence to support this idea.
The second contribution aims to analyse a key issue for European regional policy
discussing the territorial differences affecting the spatial interaction in the qual-
ity of governments (QoG) among European regions. In particular, the research
distinguishes among the typologies of networks underpinning institutional diffu-
sion between the northern and the southern European countries, thus revealing
those mechanisms which allow or limit the diffusion of quality of government.
A distinction is made among mechanisms of spatial interaction, with a focus on
the “pure” competitive interaction and on the competitive / learning interac-
tion.
The research found evidence of a strong spatial interaction in the competitive
learning / imitating mechanism among levels of QoG in European regions, with
a stronger autocorrelation in autonomous regions and southern regions. When
considering the pure competitive mechanism, a large autocorrelation among
northern regions and no autonomous ones has been found to exist. This re-
sults show that “leader” regions (those with an high QoG), corresponding to
northern regions, do react to changes in QoG levels when they are competing
economically, but they are not very sensitive to changes by strictly proximate
geographical neighbours, as in the case of learning / imitating mechanism. On
the contrary, southern regions are very sensitive to the influence exerted by those
competitors that are very close geographically. This indicates that these regions
have an higher propensity to learn from and to imitate their competitors. Fi-
nally, it has been shown how the influence by the regional level of wealth (GDP
per capita) on QoG is not linear. Such effect is indeed characterized by two
humps: with a huge influence at both very low and very high levels of GDP per
capita.
Notwithstanding increasing attention has been paid by regional scientists in the
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context of European regional policies to the relation existing between policy
effectiveness and regional institutions in general, the territorial relations among
different regional institution has not been of some interest. The issue is, instead,
of great relevance.
On the other hand, an increasing attention has been paid to the study of existing
mechanisms of diffusion and spillover dynamics of innovation activities aiming
to understand how to act effectively in the field of regional innovation policies.
Therefore, the design of regional policies for innovation might take advantage
of these contributions, by paying grater attention to possible externalities within
the development of economic strategies. Similarly, if European regional policies
consider the evidence produced within the research about institutional diffusion,
they would be able to better exploit the inherent potential of existing networks
which drive the interactions by regions underpinning the diffusion of the quality
of government.
The third contribution makes a picture of the specialization dynamic in the Ital-
ian agricultural sector among 2000 and 2010. The research takes advantage of
data coming from the agricultural census of 2000 and 2010. One of the aim
of this analysis is to assess changes in the regional geography of agricultural
specialization in Italy (NUTS 3 regional level) considering the most important
crops. Moreover, the research explores whether a spatial autocorrelation exists
among specialized regions and verifies how the spatial autocorrelation changes
when considering different productions.
In general, a raise in the level of specialization is noticeable, together with a
raise in the existing spatial autocorrelation among Italian regions, mostly in all
sectors. This means that there is a marked tendency toward clustering, which
influences the decision by producers about what typology of production to in-
vest on. In particular, a cluster dynamic is in place in the cereals and in the
industrial crops sectors. This dynamic is generally evident among northern and
central regions of the country. In the southern regions a cluster dynamic is clear
in the production of those crops which can be considered “natural” clusters,
164
such as olives and citrus fruits, in those territories.
The other aim of the third contribution is to assess the effect of specialization
on productivity of land. The analysis reveal that this effect is varying, depend-
ing on the typology of crops considered. Indeed, specialization affects positively
the productivity in some of the considered sectors (grapes, olives, and industrial
crops), while it affects negatively the productivity in the other sectors (cereals,
citrus fruits, and fruits).
This result might indicate the presence of problems of “lock−in” in those areas
highly specialized in citrus fruits, cereals, and fruits. Therefore, a suggested
policy to implement in those areas would be the encouraging of a greater diver-
sification in agricultural productions. On the contrary, in the areas which are
prone to the production of olives and grapes a policy to boost specialization
would be more desirable.
This thesis has made use of several quantitative methodologies in order to an-
swer the different research questions. In the first paper, the analysis has been
conducted on panel data, with fixed effects and time fixed effects. The second
contribution adopted “classic” spatial econometrics methodologies with a spa-
tial autoregressive model (SAR). Furthermore, the analysis conducted in this
paper uses an higher order SAR to distinguish two spatial networks among
the European regions, and a non linear spatial model (Spatial Autoregressive
Semiparametric Model) to assess the non linearities in the independent variables
explaining the quality of institutions at regional level in Europe. The third paper
makes use of “classic” methods for an exploratory spatial data analysis, to as-
sess the global and local spatial autocorrelation among Italian provinces (NUTS
3 regions) in the productive specialization of the primary sector. Moreover, in
order to assess the effect of specialization on productivity, a spatial panel data
model has been used. To control for the climate differences and to consider
the local vocations, extremely important in the case of the primary sector, the
analysis makes use of fixed effects and time fixed effects, with the control for
the spatial autocorrelation among both dependent variable and innovations.
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